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Abstract
We study the setup where each of n users holds an element from a discrete set, and the
goal is to count the number of distinct elements across all users, under the constraint of (ε, δ)-
differentially privacy:
• In the non-interactive local setting, we prove that the additive error of any protocol is
Ω(n) for any constant ε and for any δ inverse polynomial in n.
• In the single-message shuffle setting, we prove a lower bound of Ω˜(n) on the error for any
constant ε and for some δ inverse quasi-polynomial in n. We do so by building on the
moment-matching method from the literature on distribution estimation.
• In the multi-message shuffle setting, we give a protocol with at most one message per user
in expectation and with an error of O˜(
√
n) for any constant ε and for any δ inverse poly-
nomial in n. Our protocol is also robustly shuffle private, and our error of
√
n matches a
known lower bound for such protocols.
Our proof technique relies on a new notion, that we call dominated protocols, and which can also
be used to obtain the first non-trivial lower bounds against multi-message shuffle protocols for
the well-studied problems of selection and learning parity.
Our first lower bound for estimating the number of distinct elements provides the first
ω(
√
n) separation between global sensitivity and error in local differential privacy, thus an-
swering an open question of Vadhan (2017). We also provide a simple construction that gives
Ω˜(n) separation between global sensitivity and error in two-party differential privacy, thereby
answering an open question of McGregor et al. (2011).
*Email: lijieche@mit.edu. Most of this work was done at Google Research, Mountain View, CA.
†Email: badihghazi@gmail.com
‡Email: ravi.k53@gmail.com
§Email: pasin@google.com
Contents
1 Introduction 3
1.1 Counting Distinct Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.1 Lower Bounds for Local DP Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.2 Lower Bounds for Single-Message Shuffle DP Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1.3 A Communication-Efficient Shuffle DP Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Dominated Protocols and Multi-Message Shuffle DP Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.1 Lower Bounds for Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.2 Lower Bounds for Parity Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Lower Bounds for Two-Party DP Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4 Discussions and Open Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.5 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2 Overview of Techniques 8
2.1 Lower Bounds for CountDistinct via Moment Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Lower Bounds for CountDistinct and Selection via Dominated Protocols . . . . . . . . 12
3 Preliminaries 14
3.1 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.2 Differential Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.3 Shuffle Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.4 Useful Divergences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.5 Fourier Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4 Low-Privacy DPlocal and DP
1
shuffle Lower Bounds for CountDistinct 18
4.1 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.2 Low-Privacy DPlocal Lower Bounds for CountDistinct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2.1 Technical Lemmas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2.2 Construction of the Hard Dataset Distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2.3 Conditions on a Good Subset E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.2.4 The Lower Bound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2.5 A Probabilistic Construction of Good E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.3 DP1shuffle Implies DPlocal with Stronger Privacy Bound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.4 Generalizing to Public-Coin Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5 (ε, δ)-Dominated Algorithms 29
5.1 Approximate-DPshuffle Protocols are Dominated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.1.1 Merged Randomizer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.1.2 Pseudo-Locally Private Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.1.3 Multi-Message DPshuffle Protocols are Pseudo-Locally Private . . . . . . . . . 30
5.2 Bounding KL Divergence for Dominated Randomizers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6 Lower Bounds for Selection and ParityLearning 34
6.1 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.2 Lower Bound for Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.3 Lower Bound for ParityLearning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1
7 Lower Bound for CountDistinct with Maximum Hardness 38
7.1 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.2 DPlocal Lower bound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8 Low-Message DPshuffle Protocols for CountDistinct 41
8.1 Intuition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8.2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8.3 A Private-Coin Base Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8.4 Public-Coin Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
9 Lower Bounds in Two-Party Differential Privacy 52
9.1 Inner Product Lower Bound from [MMP+10] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
9.2 From Parity to the Ω˜(n) Gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
9.3 Symmetrization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
A Total Variance Bound between Mixtures of Multi-dimensional Poisson Distributions 58
B Lower Bounds on Hockey Stick Divergence 62
C Simulation of Shuffle Protocols by SQ Algorithms 64
C.1 SQ Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
C.2 Simulation of Dominated Algorithms by SQ Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
C.3 Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
D Upper Bounds for Selection in DPkshuffle 66
2
1 Introduction
Differential privacy (DP) [DMNS06, DKM+06] has become a leading framework for private-data
analysis, with several recent practical deployments [EPK14, Sha14, Gre16, App17, DKY17, Abo18].
The most commonly studied DP setting is the so-called central (aka curator) model whereby a
single authority (sometimes referred to as the analyst) is trusted with running an algorithm on the
raw data of the users and the privacy guarantee applies to the algorithm’s output.
The absence, in many scenarios, of a clear trusted authority has motivated the study of dis-
tributedDPmodels. Themost well-studied such setting is the localmodel [KLN+11] (also [War65]),
denoted henceforth by DPlocal, where the privacy guarantee is enforced at each user’s output (i.e.,
the protocol transcript). While an advantage of the local model is its very strong privacy guaran-
tees and minimal trust assumptions, the noise that has to be added can sometimes be quite large.
This has stimulated the study of “intermediate” models that seek to achieve accuracy close to the
central model while relying on more distributed trust assumptions. One such middle-ground is
the so-called shuffle (aka anonymous) model [IKOS06, BEM+17, CSU+18, EFM+19], where the users
send messages to a shuffler who randomly shuffles these messages before sending them to the an-
alyzer; the privacy guarantee is enforced on the shuffled messages (i.e., the input to the analyzer).
We study both the local and the shuffle models in this work.
1.1 Counting Distinct Elements
A basic function in data analytics is estimating the number of distinct elements in a domain of size
D held by a collection of n users, which we denote by CountDistinctn,D (and simply by CountDistinctn
if there is no restriction on the universe size). Beside its use in database management systems, it
is a well-studied problem in sketching, streaming, and communication complexity (e.g., [KNW10,
BCK+14] and the references therein). In central DP, it can be easily solved with constant error
using the Laplace mechanism [DMNS06]; see also [MMNW11, DLB19, PS20, CDSKY20].
We obtain new results on (ε, δ)-DP protocols for CountDistinct in the local and shuffle settings1.
1.1.1 Lower Bounds for Local DP Protocols
Our first result is a lower bound on the additive error of DPlocal protocols
2 for counting distinct
elements.
Theorem 1.1. For any ε = O(1), no public-coin (ε, o(1/n))-DPlocal protocol can solve
3 CountDistinctn,n
with error o(n).
The lower bound in Theorem 1.1 is asymptotically tight4. Furthermore, it answers a question of
Vadhan [Vad17, Open Problem 9.6], who asked if there is a function with a gap of ω(
√
n) between
its (global) sensitivity and the smallest achievable error by any DPlocal protocol.
5 As the global
1For formal definitions, please refer to Section 3. We remark that, throughout this work, we consider the non-
interactive local model where all users apply the same randomizer (see Definition 3.6). We briefly discuss in Section 1.4
possible extensions to interactive local models.
2See Section 3 for the the formal (standard) definition of public-coin DP protocols. Note that private-coin protocols
are a sub-class of public-coin protocols, so all of our lower bounds apply to private-coin protocols as well.
3Throughout this work, we say that a randomized algorithm solves a problem with error e if with probability 0.99 it
incurs error at most e.
4The trivial algorithm that always outputs 0 incurs an error n.
5 To the best of our knowledge, the largest previously known gap between global sensitivity and error was O(
√
n),
which is achieved, e.g., by binary summation [CSS12].
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sensitivity of the number of distinct elements is 1, Theorem 1.1 exhibits a (natural) function for
which this gap is as large as Ω(n). While Theorem 1.1 applies to the constant ε regime, it turns out
we can prove a lower bound for much less private protocols (i.e., having a much larger ε value) at
the cost of polylogarithmic factors in the error:
Theorem 1.2. For some ε = ln(n)−O(ln ln n) and D = Θ(n/polylog(n)), no public-coin (ε, n−ω(1))-
DPlocal protocol can solve CountDistinctn,D with error o(D).
To prove Theorem 1.2, we build on the moment matching method from the literature on (non-
private) distribution estimation, namely [VV17, WY19], and tailor it to CountDistinct in the DPlocal
setting (see Section 2.1 for more details on this connection). The bound on the privacy parameter
ε in Theorem 1.2 turns out to be very close to tight: the error drops quadratically when ε exceeds
ln n. This is shown in the next theorem:
Theorem 1.3. There is a (ln(n) +O(1))-DPlocal protocol solving CountDistinctn,n with error O(
√
n).
1.1.2 Lower Bounds for Single-Message Shuffle DP Protocols
In light of the negative result in Theorem 1.2, a natural question is whether CountDistinct can be
solved in a weaker distributed DP setting such as the shuffle model. It turns out that this is not
possible using any shuffle protocol where each user sends nomore than 1 message (for brevity, we
will henceforth denote this class by DP1shuffle, and more generally denote by DP
k
shuffle the variant
where each user can send up to k messages). Note that the class DP1shuffle includes any method
obtained by taking a DPlocal protocol and applying the so-called amplification by shuffling results of
[EFM+19, BBGN19].
In the case where ε is any constant and δ is inverse quasi-polynomial in n, the improvement in
the error for DP1shuffle protocols compared to DPlocal is at most polylogarithmic factors:
Theorem 1.4. For all ε = O(1), there are δ = 2− polylog(n) and D = n/polylog(n) such that no public-
coin (ε, δ)-DP1shuffle protocol can solve CountDistinctn,D with error o(D).
We note that Theorem 1.4 essentially answers a more general variant of Vadhan’s question:
it shows that even for DP1shuffle protocols (which include DPlocal protocols as a sub-class) the gap
between sensitivity and the error can be as large as Ω˜(n) .
The proof of Theorem 1.4 follows by combining Theorem 1.2 with the following connection
between DPlocal and DP
1
shuffle:
Lemma 1.5. For any ε = O(1) and δ ≤ δ0 ≤ 1/n, if the randomizer R is (ε, δ)-DP1shuffle on n users, then
R is
(
ln n− ln(Θε(log δ−10 / log δ−1)), δ0
)
-DPlocal.
We remark that Lemma 1.5 provides a stronger quantitative bound than the qualitatively sim-
ilar connections in [CSU+18, GGK+19]; specifically, we obtain the term ln(Θε(log δ
−1
0 / log δ
−1)),
which was not present in the aforementioned works. This turns out to be crucial for our purposes,
as this term gives the O(ln ln n) term necessary to apply Theorem 1.2.
1.1.3 A Communication-Efficient Shuffle DP Protocol
In contrastwith Theorem1.4, Balcer et al. [BCJM20] recently gave a DPshuffle protocol forCountDistinctn,D
with error O(
√
D). Their protocol sends Ω(D) messages per user. We instead show that an error
of O˜(
√
D) can still be guaranteed with each user sending in expectation at most one message each
of lengthO(logD) bits.
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Theorem 1.6. For all ε ≤ O(1) and δ ≤ 1/n, there is a public-coin (ε, δ)-DPshuffle protocol that solves
CountDistinctn with error
√
min(n,D) · poly(log(1/δ)/ε) where the expected number of messages sent
by each user is at most one.
In the special case where D = o(n/poly(ε−1 log(δ−1))), we moreover obtain a private-coin
DPshuffle protocol achieving the same guarantees as in Theorem 1.6 (see Theorem 8.4 for a formal
statement). Note that Theorem 1.6 is in sharp contrast with the lower bound shown in Theorem 1.4
for DP1shuffle protocols. Indeed, for δ inverse quasi-polynomial in n, the former implies a public-
coin protocol with less than one message per-user in expectation having error O˜(
√
n) whereas the
latter proves that no such protocol exists, even with error as large as Ω˜(n), if we restrict each user
to send one message in the worst case.
A strengthening of DPshuffle protocols called robustDPshuffle protocols
6 was studied by [BCJM20],
who proved an Ω
(√
min(D, n)
)
lower bound on the error of any protocol solvingCountDistinctn,D.
Our protocols are robust DPshuffle and, therefore, achieve the optimal error (up to polylogarithmic
factors) among all robust DPshuffle protocols, while only sending at most one message per user in
expectation.
1.2 Dominated Protocols and Multi-Message Shuffle DP Protocols
The technique underlying the proof of Theorem 1.1 can be extended beyond DPlocal protocols
for CountDistinct. It applies to a broader category of protocols that we call dominated, defined as
follows:
Definition 1.7. We say that a randomizer R : X →M is (ε, δ)-dominated, if there exists a distribu-
tion D onM such that for all x ∈ X and all E ⊆M,
Pr[R(x) ∈ E] ≤ eε · Pr
D
[E] + δ.
In this case, we also say R is (ε, δ)-dominated by D. We define (ε, δ)-dominated protocols in the
same way as (ε, δ)-DPlocal, except that we require the randomizer to be (ε, δ)-dominated instead of
being (ε, δ)-DP.
Note that an (ε, δ)-DPlocal randomizer R is (ε, δ)-dominated: we can fix a y
∗ ∈ X and take
D = R(y∗). Therefore, our new definition is a relaxation of DPlocal.
We show that multi-message DPshuffle protocols are dominated, which allows us to prove the
first non-trivial lower bounds against DP
O(1)
shuffle protocols.
Before formally stating this connection, we recall why known lower bounds against DP1shuffle
protocols [CSU+18, GGK+19, BC20] do not extend to DP
O(1)
shuffle protocols.
7 These prior works use
the connection stating that any (ε, δ)-DP1shuffle protocol is also (ε + ln n, δ)-DPlocal [CSU
+18, Theo-
rem 6.2]. It thus suffices for them to prove lower bounds for DPlocal protocols with low privacy
requirement (i.e., (ε+ ln n, δ)-DPlocal), for which lower bound techniques are known or developed.
For ε-DP1shuffle protocols, [BC20] showed that they are also ε-DPlocal; therefore, lower bounds on
6Roughly speaking, they are DPshuffle protocols whose transcript remains private even if a constant fraction of users
drop out from the protocol.
7We remark that [GGK+20] developed a technique for proving lower bounds on the communication complexity (i.e.,
the number of bits sent per user) for multi-message protocols. Their techniques do not apply to our setting as our lower
bounds are in terms of the number of messages, and do not put any restriction on the message length. Furthermore,
their technique only applies to pure-DP where δ = 0, whereas ours applies also to approximate-DP where δ > 0.
5
DPlocal protocols automatically translate to lower bounds on pure-DP
1
shuffle protocols. To apply
this proof framework to DP
O(1)
shuffle protocols, a natural first step would be to connect DP
O(1)
shuffle pro-
tocols to DPlocal protocols. However, as observed by [BC20, Section 4.1], there exists an ε-DP
O(1)
shuffle
protocol that is not DPlocal for any privacy parameter. That is, there is no analogous connection
between DPlocal protocols and multi-message DPshuffle protocols, even if the latter can only send
O(1) messages per user.
In contrast, the next lemma captures the connection betweenmulti-message DPshuffle and dom-
inated protocols.
Lemma 1.8. If R is (ε, δ)-DPkshuffle on n users, then it is (ε + k(1+ ln n), δ)-dominated.
By considering dominated protocols and using Lemma 1.8, we obtain the first lower bounds
for multi-message DPshuffle protocols for two well-studied problems: Selection and ParityLearning.
1.2.1 Lower Bounds for Selection
The Selection problem on n users is defined as follows. The ith user has an input xi ∈ {0, 1}D
and the goal is to output an index j ∈ [D] such that
n
∑
i=1
xi,j ≥
(
max
j∗
n
∑
i=1
xi,j∗
)
− n/10. Selection is
well-studied in DP (e.g., [DJW13, SU17, Ull18]) and its variants are useful primitives for several
statistical and algorithmic problems including feature selection, hypothesis testing and clustering.
In central DP, the exponential mechanism of [MT07] yields an ε-DP algorithm for Selection when
n = Oε(logD). On the other hand, it is known that any (ε, δ)-DPlocal protocol for Selection with ε =
O(1) and δ = O(1/n1.01) requires n = Ω(D logD) users [Ull18]. Moreover, [CSU+18] obtained a
(ε, 1/nO(1))-DPDshuffle protocol for n = O˜ε(
√
D). By contrast, for DP1shuffle protocols, a lower bound
of Ω(D1/17) was obtained in [CSU+18] and improved to Ω(D) in [GGK+19].
The next theorem give a lower bounds for Selection that holds against approximate-DPkshuffle
protocols. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first lower bound even for k = 2 (and even for
the special case of pure protocols, where δ = 0).
Theorem 1.9. For any ε = O(1), any public-coin (ε, o(1/D))-DPkshuffle protocol that solves Selection
requires n ≥ Ω
(
D
k
)
.
We remark that combining the advanced composition theorem for DP and known DPshuffle ag-
gregation algorithms, one can obtain a (ε, 1/ poly(n))-DPkshuffle protocol for Selection with O˜(D/
√
k)
samples for any k ≤ D (see Appendix D for details).
1.2.2 Lower Bounds for Parity Learning
In ParityLearning, there is a hidden random vector s ∈ {0, 1}D , each user gets a random vector
x ∈ {0, 1}D together with the inner product 〈s, x〉 over F2, and the goal is to recover s. This
problem is well-known for separating PAC learning from the Statistical Query (SQ) learningmodel
[Kea98]. In DP, it was studied by [KLN+11] who gave a central DP protocol (also based on the
exponential mechanism) computing it for n = O(D), and moreover proved a lower bound of
n = 2Ω(D) for any DPlocal protocol, thus obtaining the first exponential separation between the
central and local settings.
We give a lower bound for ParityLearning that hold against approximate-DPkshuffle protocols:
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Theorem 1.10. For any ε = O(1), if P is a public-coin (ε, o(1/n))-DPkshuffle protocol that solves Par-
ityLearning with probability at least 0.99, then n ≥ Ω(2D/(k+1)).
Our lower bounds for ParityLearning can be generalized to the Statistical Query (SQ) learning
framework of [Kea98] (see Section C for more details).
Independent Work. In a recent concurrent work, Cheu and Ullman [CU20] proved that robust
DPshuffle protocols solving Selection and ParityLearning require Ω(
√
D) and Ω(2
√
D) samples, re-
spectively. Their results have no restriction on the number of messages sent by each user, but they
only hold against the special case of robust protocols. Our results provide stronger lower bounds
when the number of messages per user is less than
√
D, and apply to the most general DPshuffle
model without the robustness restriction.
1.3 Lower Bounds for Two-Party DP Protocols
Finally, we consider another model of distributed DP, called the two-party model [MMP+10], de-
noted DPtwo-party. In this model, there are two parties, each holding part of the dataset. The DP
guarantee is enforced on the view of each party (i.e., the transcript, its private randomness, and
its input). See Section 9 for a formal treatment.
McGregor et al. [MMP+10] studied the DPtwo-party and proved an interesting separation of
Ωε(n) between the global sensitivity and ε-DP protocol in this model. However, this lower bound
does not extend to the approximate-DP case (where δ > 0); in this case, the largest knowngap (also
proved in [MMP+10]) is only Ω˜ε(
√
n), and it was left as an open question if this can be improved8.
We answer this question by showing that the gap of Ω˜ε(n) holds even against approximate-DP
protocols:
Theorem 1.11. For any ε = O(1) and any sufficiently large n ∈ N, there is a function f : {0, 1}2n → R
whose global sensitivity is one and such that no (ε, o(1/n))-DPtwo-party protocol can compute f to within
an error of o(n/ log n).
The above bound is tight up to a logarithmic factors in n, as it is trivial to achieve an error of n.
The proof of Theorem 1.11 is unlike others in the paper; in fact, we only employ simple reduc-
tions starting from the hardness of inner product function already shown in [MMP+10]. Specifi-
cally, our function is a sum of blocks of inner product modulo 2. While this function is not sym-
metric, we show (Theorem 9.5) that it can be easily symmetrized.
1.4 Discussions and Open Questions
In this work, we studyDP in distributedmodels, including the local and shuffle settings. By build-
ing on the moment matching method and using the newly defined notion of dominated protocols,
we give novel lower bounds in both models for three fundamental problems: CountDistinct, Selec-
tion, and ParityLearning. While our lower bounds are (nearly) tight in a large setting of parameters,
there are still many interesting open questions, three of which we highlight below:
• DPshuffle Lower Bounds for Protocols with UnboundedNumber of Messages. Our connec-
tion between DPshuffle and dominated protocols becomes weaker as k → ∞ (Lemma 1.8).
8The conference version of the paper [MMP+10] actually claimed to also have a lower bound Ωε(n) for the
approximate-DP case as well. However, it was later found to be incorrect; see [MMP+11] for more discussions.
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As a result, it cannot be used to establish lower bounds against DPshuffle protocols with a
possibly unbounded number of messages. In fact, we are not aware of any separation be-
tween central DP and DPshuffle without a restriction on the number of messages and without
the robustness restriction. This remains a fundamental open question. (In contrast, separa-
tions between central DP and DPlocal are well-known, even for basic functions such as binary
summation [CSS12].)
• Lower Bounds against Interactive Local/ShuffleModel. Our lower bounds hold in the non-
interactive local and shuffle DP models, where all users send their messages simultaneously
in a single round. While it seems plausible that our lower bounds can be extended to the
sequentially interactive local DP model [DJW13] (where each user speaks once but not simul-
taneously), it is unclear how to extend them to the fully interactive local DP model.
The situation for DPshuffle however is more complicated. Specifically, we are not aware of
a formal treatment of an interactive setting for the shuffle model, which would be the first
step in providing either upper or lower bounds. We remark that certain definitions could
lead to the model being as powerful as the central model (in terms of achievable accuracy
and putting aside communication constraints); see e.g., [IKOS06] on how to perform secure
computations under a certain definition of the shuffle model.
• DP1shuffle Lower Bounds for CountDistinct with Larger δ. All but one of our lower bounds
hold as long as δ = n−ω(1), which is a standard assumption in the DP literature. The only
exception is that of Theorem 1.4, which requires δ = 2−Ω(log
c n) for some constant c > 0. It is
interesting whether this can be relaxed to δ = n−ω(1).
1.5 Organization
We describe in Section 2 the techniques underlying our results.Some basic definitions and notation
are given in Section 3. We prove our main lower bounds for CountDistinct (Theorems 1.2 and 1.4) in
Section 4. In Section 5, we define dominated protocols and prove Lemma 1.8. Our lower bounds
for Selection and ParityLearning are then proved in Section 6. Theorem 1.1 is then proved in Sec-
tion 7. Our DP≥1shuffle protocol for CountDistinct is presented and analyzed in Section 8. Finally, our
lower bounds in the two-party model (in particular, Theorem 1.11) are proved in Section 9. Some
deferred proofs appear in Appendices A and B. The connection to the SQ model is presented in
Appendix C. Finally, in Appendix D, we describe the DPkshuffle protocol for Selection with sample
complexity O˜(D/
√
k).
2 Overview of Techniques
In this section, we describe themain intuition behind our lower bounds. As alluded to in Section 1,
we give two different proofs of the lower bounds for CountDistinct in the DPlocal and DPshuffle set-
tings, each with its own advantages:
• Proof via Moment Matching. Our first proof is technically the hardest in our work. It
applies to the much more challenging low-privacy setting (i.e., (ln n−O(ln ln n), δ)-DPlocal),
and shows an Ω(n/polylog(n)) lower bound on the additive error (Theorem 1.2). Together
with our new improved connection betweenDP1shuffle and DPlocal (Lemma 1.5), it also implies
the same lower bound for protocols in the DP1shuffle model. The key ideas behind the first
proof will be discussed in Section 2.1.
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• Proof via Dominated Protocols. Our second proof has the advantage of giving the optimal
Ω(n) lower bound on the additive error (Theorem 1.1), but only in the constant privacy
regime (i.e., (O(1), δ)-DPlocal), and it is relatively simple compared to the first proof.
Moreover, the second proof technique is very general and is a conceptual contribution: it
can be applied to show lower bounds for other fundamental problems (i.e., Selection and
ParityLearning; Theorems 1.9 and 1.10) against multi-message DPshuffle protocols. We will
highlight the intuition behind the second proof in Section 2.2.
While our lower bounds also work for the public-coin DPshuffle models, throughout this sec-
tion, we focus on private-coin models in order to simplify the presentation. The full proofs ex-
tending to public-coin protocols are given in later sections.
2.1 Lower Bounds for CountDistinct via Moment Matching
To clearly illustrate the key ideas behind the first proof, we will focus on the pure-DP case where
each user can only send O(log n) bits. In Section 4, we generalize the proof to approximate-DP
and remove the restriction on communication complexity.
Theorem 2.1 (A Weaker Version of Theorem 1.2). For ε = ln(n/ log7 n) and D = n/ log5 n, no
ε-DPlocal protocol where each user sends O(log n) bits can solve CountDistinctn,D with error o(D).
Throughout our discussion, we use R : [D] →M to denote a ln(n/ log7 n)-DPlocal randomizer.
By the communication complexity condition of Theorem 2.1, we have that |M| ≤ poly(n).
Our proof is inspired by the lower bounds for estimating distinct elements in the property test-
ing model, e.g., [VV17, WY19]. In particular, we use the so-called Poissonization trick. To discuss
this trick, we start with some notation. For a vector ~λ ∈ RD, we use ~Poi(~λ) to denote the joint
distribution of D independent Poisson random variables:
~Poi(~λ) := (Poi(~λ1),Poi(~λ2), . . . ,Poi(~λn)).
For a distribution ~U on RD, we define the correspondingmixture ofmulti-dimensional Poisson
distributions as follows:
E[ ~Poi(~U)] := E
~λ←~U
~Poi(~λ).
For two random variables X and Y supported on RM, we use X + Y to denote the random
variable distributed as a sum of two independent samples from X and Y.
Shuffling the Outputs of the Local Protocol. Our first observation is that the analyzer for any lo-
cal protocol computingCountDistinct should achieve the same accuracy if it only sees the histogram
of the randomizers’ outputs. This holds because only seeing the histogram of the outputs is equiv-
alent to shuffling the outputs by a uniformly random permutation, which is in turn equivalent to
shuffling the users in the dataset uniformly at random. Since shuffling the users in a dataset does
not affect the number of distinct elements, it follows that only seeing the histogram does not affect
the accuracy. Therefore, we only have to consider the histogram of the outputs of the local pro-
tocol computing CountDistinct. For a datasetW, we use HistR(W) to denote the distribution of the
histogram with randomizer R.
Poissonization Trick. Given a distribution D on M, suppose we draw a sample m ← Poi(λ),
and then draw m samples from D. If we use N to denote the random variable corresponding to
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the histogram of these m samples, it follows that each coordinate of N is independent, and N is
distributed as ~Poi(λ~µ), where ~µi = Di for each i ∈ M.
We can now apply the above trick to the context of local protocols (recall that by our first ob-
servation, we can focus on the histogram of the outputs). Suppose we build a dataset by drawing
a sample m ← Poi(λ) and then adding m users with input z. By the above discussion, the corre-
sponding histogram of the outputs with randomizer R is distributed as ~Poi(λ · R(z)), where R(z)
is treated as an |M|-dimensional vector corresponding to its probability distribution.
Moment-Matching Random Variables. Our next ingredient is the following construction of two
moment-matching random variables used in [WY19]. Let L ∈ N and Λ = Θ(L2). There are two
random variables U and V supported on {0} ∪ [1,Λ], such that E[U] = E[V] = 1 and E[U j] =
E[V j] for every j ∈ [L]. Moreover U0 −V0 > 0.9. That is, U and V have the same moments up to
degree L, while the probabilities of them being zero differs significantly. We will set L = log n and
hence Λ = Θ(log2 n).
Construction ofHardDistribution via Signal/NoiseDecomposition. Recalling thatD = n/ log5 n,
we will construct two input distributions for CountDistinctn,D.
9 A sample from both distributions
consists of two parts: a signal part with D many users in expectation, and a noise part with n− D
many users in expectation.
Formally, for a distributionW over R≥0 and a subset E ⊆ [D], the dataset distributions DWsignal
and DEnoise are constructed as follows:
• DWsignal: for each i ∈ [D], we independently draw λi ← W, and ni ← Poi(λi), and add ni
many users with input i.
• DEnoise: for each i ∈ E, we independently draw ni ← Poi((n − D)/|E|), and add ni many
users with input i.
We are going to fix a “good” subset E of [D] such that |E| ≤ 0.02 · D (we will later specify the
other conditions for being “good”). Therefore, when it is clear from the context, we will use Dnoise
instead of DEnoise.
Our two hard distributions are then constructed as DU := DUsignal +Dnoise and DV := DVsignal +
Dnoise. Using the fact that E[U] = E[V] = 1, one can verify that there are D users in each of
DUsignal and DVsignal in expectation. Similarly, one can also verify there are n− D users in Dnoise in
expectation. Hence, both DU and DV have n users in expectation. In fact, the number of users
from both distributions concentrates around n.
We now justify our naming of the signal/noise distributions. First, note that the number of
distinct elements in the signal parts DUsignal and DVsignal concentrates around (1− E[e−U ]) · D and
(1−E[e−V ]) · D respectively. By our condition that U0 −V0 > 0.9, it follows that the signal parts
of DU and DV separates their numbers of distinct elements by at least 0.4D. Second, note that
although Dnoise has n− D ≫ D many users in expectation, they are from the subset E of size less
than 0.02 · n. Therefore, these users collectively cannot change the number of distinct elements
by more than 0.02 · n, and the numbers of distinct elements in DU and DV are still separated by
Ω(D).
Decomposition of Noise Part. To establish the desired lower bound, it now suffices to show for
the local randomizer R, it holds thatHistR(DU) and HistR(DV) are very close in statistical distance.
9In fact, in our presentation the number of inputs in each dataset from our hard distributions will not be exactly n,
but only concentrated around n. This issue can be easily resolved by throwing “extra” users in the dataset; we refer the
reader to Section 4.2 for the details.
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ForW ∈ {U,V}, we can decompose HistR(DW) as
HistR(DW) = ∑
i∈[D]
~Poi(W · R(i)) + ∑
i∈[E]
~Poi((n− D)/|E| · R(i)).
By the additive property of Poisson distributions, letting ~ν = (n− D)/|E| · ∑i∈[E] R(i), we have
that ∑i∈[E] ~Poi((n− D)/|E| · R(i)) = ~Poi(~ν).
Our key idea is to decompose ~ν carefully into D + 1 nonnegative vectors ~ν(0),~ν(1), . . . ,~ν(D),
such that~ν = ∑Di=0~ν
(i). Then, forW ∈ {U,V}, we have
HistR(DW) = ~Poi(~ν(0)) + ∑
i∈[D]
~Poi(W · R(i) +~ν(i)).
To show that HistR(DU) and HistR(DV) are close, it suffices to show that for each i ∈ [D], it is the
case that ~Poi(U · R(i) +~ν(i)) and ~Poi(V · R(i) +~ν(i)) are close. We show that they are close when
~ν(i) is sufficiently large on every coordinate compared to R(i).
Lemma 2.2 (Simplification of Lemma 4.3). For each i ∈ [D], and every ~λ ∈ (R≥0)M, if ~λz ≥ 2Λ2 ·
R(i)z for every z ∈ M, then10
‖E[ ~Poi(U · R(i) +~λ)]−E[ ~Poi(V · R(i) +~λ)]‖TV ≤ 1
n2
.
To apply Lemma 2.2, we simply set ~ν(i) = (2Λ2) · R(i) and ~ν(0) = ~ν − ∑i∈[D]~ν(i). Letting
~µ = ∑i∈[D] R(i), the requirement that ~ν(0) has to be nonnegative translates to ~νz ≥ 2Λ2 · ~µz, for
each z ∈ M.
Construction of a Good Subset E. So we want to pick a subset E ⊆ [D] of size at most 0.02 · D
such that the corresponding~νE = (n− D)/|E| ·∑i∈[E] R(i) satisfies~νEz ≥ 2Λ2 ·~µz for each z ∈ M.
We will show that a simple random construction works with high probability: i.e., one can simply
add each element of [D] to E independently with probability 0.01.
More specifically, for each z ∈ M, we will show that with high probability~νEz ≥ 2Λ2 ·~µz. Then
the correctness of our construction follows from a union bound (and this step crucially uses the
fact that |M| ≤ poly(n)).
Now, let us fix a z ∈ M. Let m∗ = maxi∈[D] R(i)z. Since R is ln(n/ log7 n)-DP, it follows that
~νz ≥ n−Dn/ log7 n ·m∗ ≥
log7 n
2 ·m∗. We consider the following two cases:
1. If m∗ ≥ ~µz/ log2 n, we immediately get that ~νz ≥ log5 n/2 · ~µz ≥ 2Λ2 · ~µz (which uses the
fact that Λ = Θ(log2 n)).
2. If m∗ < ~µz/ log2 n, then in this case, the mass ~µz is distributed over at least log2 n many
components R(i)z. Applying Hoeffding’s inequality shows that with high probability over
E, it is the case that~νEz ≥ Θ(n/D) ·~µz ≥ Λ2 ·~µz (which uses the fact that D = n/ log5 n).
See the proof of Lemma 4.5 for a formal argument and how to get rid of the assumption that
|M| ≤ poly(n).
The Lower Bound. From the above discussions, we get that
‖HistR(DU)− HistR(DV)‖TV ≤
D
∑
i=1
‖E[ ~Poi(U · R(i) +~ν(i))]−E[ ~Poi(V · R(i) +~ν(i))]‖TV ≤ 1/n.
10We use ‖D1 −D2‖TV to denote the total variation (aka statistical) distance between two distributions D1,D2.
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Hence, the analyzer of the local protocol with randomizer R cannot distinguish DU and DV ,
and thus it cannot solve CountDistinctn,D with error o(D) and 0.99 probability. See the proof of
Theorem 4.1 for a formal argument and how to deal with the fact that there may not be exactly n
users in dataset from DU or DV .
Single-Message DPshuffle Lower Bound. To apply the above lower bound to DP
1
shuffle protocols,
the natural idea is to resort to the connection between the DP1shuffle and DPlocal models. In particu-
lar, [CSU+18] showed that (ε, δ)-DP1shuffle protocols are also (ε + ln n, δ)-DPlocal.
It may seem that the ln n privacy guarantee is very close to the ln n−O(ln ln n) one in Theo-
rem 1.2. But surprisingly, it turns out (as was stated in Theorem 1.3) that there is a (ln n+O(1))-
DPlocal protocol solving CountDistinctn,n (hence also CountDistinctn,D) with error O(
√
n). Hence, to
establish the DP1shuffle lower bound (Theorem 1.4), we rely on the following stronger connection
between DP1shuffle and DPlocal protocols.
Lemma 2.3 (Simplification of Lemma 1.5). For every δ ≤ 1/nω(1), if the randomizer R is (O(1), δ)-
DP1shuffle on n users, then R is
(
ln(n log2 n/ log δ−1), n−ω(1)
)
-DPlocal.
Setting δ = 2− log
k n for a sufficiently large k and combining Lemma 2.3 and Theorem 1.2 gives
us the desired lower bound against DP1shuffle protocols.
2.2 Lower Bounds for CountDistinct and Selection via Dominated Protocols
Wewill first describe the proof ideas behind Theorem 1.1, which is restated below. Then, we apply
the same proof technique to obtain lower bounds for Selection (the lower bound for ParityLearning
is established similarly; see Section 6.3 for details).
Lemma 2.4 (Detailed Version of Theorem 1.1). For ε = o(ln n), no (ε, o(1/n))-dominated protocol can
solve CountDistinct with error o(n/eε).
Hard Distributions for CountDistinctn,n. We now construct our hard instances for CountDistinctn,n.
For simplicity, we assume n = 2D for an integer D, and identify the input space [n] with {0, 1}D
by a fixed bijection. Let UD be the the uniform distribution over {0, 1}D . For (ℓ, s) ∈ [2]× {0, 1}D ,
we let Dℓ,s be the uniform distribution on {x ∈ {0, 1}D : 〈x, s〉 = ℓ}.
We also use Dα
ℓ,s to denote the mixture of Dℓ,s and UD which outputs a sample from Dℓ,s with
probability α and a sample from UD with probability 1− α.
For a parameter α > 0, we consider the following two dataset distributions with n users:
• Wuniform: each user gets an i.i.d. input from UD. That is,Wuniform := U⊗nD .
• Wα: to sample a dataset from Wα, we first draw (ℓ, s) from [2]× {0, 1}D uniformly at ran-
dom, then each user gets an i.i.d. input from Dα
ℓ,s. Formally,Wα := E(ℓ,s)←[2]×{0,1}D(Dαℓ,s)⊗n.
Since for every ℓ, s, it holds that |supp(D1
ℓ,s)| ≤ n/2, the number of distinct elements from
any dataset in W1 is at most n/2. On the other hand, since UD is a uniform distribution over n
elements, a random dataset fromWuniform = W0 has roughly (1− e−1) · n > n/2 distinct elements
with high probability. Hence, the expected number of distinct elements of datasets from Wα is
controlled by the parameter α. A simple but tedious calculation shows that it is approximately
(1− e−1 · cosh(α)) · n, which can be approximated by (1− e−1 · (1+ α2)) · n for n−0.1 < α < 0.01
(see Proposition 7.1 for more details). Hence, any protocol solving CountDistinct with error o(α2n)
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should be able to distinguish between the above two distributions. Our goal is to show that this is
impossible for (ε, o(1/n))-dominated protocols.
Bounding KL Divergence for Dominated Protocols. Our next step is to upper-bound the statisti-
cal distance ‖HistR(Wuniform)−HistR(Wα)‖TV . As in previous work [Ull18, GGK+19, ENU20], we
may upper-bound the KL divergence instead. By the convexity and chain-rule properties of KL
divergence, it follows that
KL(HistR(Wα)||HistR(Wuniform)) ≤ E
(ℓ,s)←[2]×{0,1}D
KL(R(Dαℓ,s)⊗n||R(UD)⊗n)
= n · E
(ℓ,s)←[2]×{0,1}D
KL(R(Dαℓ,s)||R(UD)). (1)
Bounding the Average KL Divergence between a Family and a Single Distribution. We are now
ready to introduce our general tool for bounding average KL divergence quantities like (1). We
first set up some notation. Let I be an index set and {λv}v∈I be a family of distributions on X , let
pi be a distribution on I , and µ be a distribution on X . For simplicity, we assume that for every
x ∈ X and v ∈ I , it holds that (λv)x ≤ 2 · µx (which is true for {Dαℓ,s}(ℓ,s)∈[2]×{0,1}D and UD).
Theorem 2.5. Let W : R → R be a concave function such that for all functions ψ : X → R≥0 satisfying
ψ(µ) ≤ 1, it holds that
E
v←pi
[
(ψ(λv)− ψ(µ))2
] ≤W(‖ψ‖∞).
Then for an (ε, δ)-dominated randomizer R, it follows that
E
v←pi[KL(R(λv)||R(µ))] ≤ O (W(2e
ε) + δ) .
Bounding (1) via Fourier Analysis. To apply Theorem 2.5, for f : X → R≥0 with f (UD) =
Ex∈{0,1}D [ f (x)] ≤ 1, we want to bound
E
(ℓ,s)←[2]×{0,1}D
[( f (Dαℓ,s)− f (UD))2] = E
s∈{0,1}D
α2 · fˆ (s)2.
By Parseval’s Identity (see Lemma 3.8),
∑
s∈{0,1}D
fˆ (s)2 = E
x∈{0,1}D
f (x)2 ≤ f (UD) · ‖ f‖∞ ≤ ‖ f‖∞.
Therefore, we can setW(L) := α2 · L
2D
, and apply Theorem 2.5 to obtain
E
(ℓ,s)←[2]×{0,1}D
KL(R(Dαℓ,s)||R(UD)) ≤ O(α2 · eε/n+ δ).
We set α such that α2 = c/eε for a sufficiently small constant c and note that δ = o(1/n). It fol-
lows that KL(HistR(Wα)||HistR(Wuniform)) ≤ 0.01, and therefore ‖HistR(Wα)−HistR(Wuniform)‖TV ≤
0.1 by Pinsker’s inequality. Hence, we conclude that (ε, o(1/n))-dominated protocols cannot solve
CountDistinctn,n with error o(n/eε), completing the proof of Lemma 2.4. Now Theorem 1.1 follows
from Lemma 2.4 and the fact that (ε, δ)-DPlocal protocols are also (ε, δ)-dominated.
Lower Bounds for Selection against Multi-Message DPshuffle Protocols. Now we show how to
apply Theorem 2.5 and Lemma 2.3 to prove lower bounds for Selection. For (ℓ, j) ∈ [2] × [D], let
Dℓ,j be the uniform distribution on all length-D binary strings with jth bit being ℓ. Recall that
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UD is the uniform distribution on {0, 1}D . Again we aim to upper-bound the average-case KL
divergence E(ℓ,j)←[2]×[D]KL(R(Dℓ,j)||R(UD)).
To apply Theorem 2.5, for f : X → R≥0 with f (UD) = Ex∈{0,1}D [ f (x)] ≤ 1, we want to bound
E
(ℓ,j)←[2]×[D]
[( f (Dαℓ,j)− f (UD))2] = E
j∈[D]
fˆ ({j})2.
By the Level-1 Inequality (see Lemma 3.7), it is the case that
∑
j∈[D]
fˆ ({j})2 ≤ O(log ‖ f‖∞).
Therefore, we can set W(L) := c1 · log LD for an appropriate constant c1, and apply Theorem 2.5 to
obtain
E
(ℓ,j)←[2]×[D]
KL(R(Dℓ,j)||R(UD)) ≤ O
( ε
D
+ δ
)
.
Combining this with Lemma 2.3 completes the proof (see the proofs of Lemma 6.3 and Theorem1.9
for the details).
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Notation
For a function f : X → R, a distribution D on X , and an element z ∈ X , we use f (D) to denote
E
x←D
[ f (x)] and Dz to denote Pr
x←D
[x = z]. For a subset E ⊆ X , we use DE to denote ∑
z∈E
Dz =
Pr
x←D
[x ∈ E]. We also use UD to denote the uniform distribution over {0, 1}D .
For two distributions D1 and D2 on sets X and Y respectively, we use D1 ⊗ D2 to denote
their product distribution over X × Y . For two random variables X and Y supported on RD for
D ∈ N, we use X + Y to denote the random variable distributed as a sum of two independent
samples from X and Y. For any set S , we denote by S∗ the set consisting of sequences on S , i.e.,
S∗ = ∪n≥0Sn. For x ∈ R, let [x]+ denote max(x, 0). For a predicate P, we use 1[P] to denote the
corresponding Boolean value of P, that is, 1[P] = 1 if P is true, and 0 otherwise.
For a distribution D on a finite set X and an event E ⊆ X such that Pr
z←D
[z ∈ E ] > 0, we use
D|E to denote the conditional distribution such that
(D|E)z =

Dz
Prz←D[z ∈ E ] if z ∈ E ,
0 otherwise.
Slightly overloading the notation, we also use α · D1 + (1− α) · D2 to denote the mixture of dis-
tributions D1 and D2 with mixing weights α and (1− α) respectively. Whether + means mixture
or convolution will be clear from the context unless explicitly stated.
3.2 Differential Privacy
We now recall the basics of differential privacy that we will need. Fix a finite set X , the space of
user reports. A dataset X is an element of X ∗, namely a tuple consisting of elements of X . Let
hist(X) ∈ N|X | be the histogram of X: for any x ∈ X , the xth component of hist(X) is the number
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of occurrences of x in the dataset X. We will consider datasets X,X′ to be equivalent if they have
the same histogram (i.e., the ordering of the elements x1, . . . , xn does not matter). For a multiset S
whose elements are in X , we will also write hist(S) to denote the histogram of S (so that the xth
component is the number of copies of x in S).
Let n ∈ N, and consider a dataset X = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n. For an element x ∈ X , let fX(x) =
hist(X)x
n
be the frequency of x in X, namely the fraction of elements of X that are equal to x. Two
datasetsX,X′ are said to be neighboring if they differ in a single element, meaning that we can write
(up to equivalence) X = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) and X
′ = (x′1, x2, . . . , xn). In this case, we write X ∼ X′.
Let Z be a set; we now define the differential privacy of a randomized function P : X n → Z as
follows.
Definition 3.1 (Differential privacy (DP) [DMNS06, DKM+06]). A randomized algorithm P : X n →
Z is (ε, δ)-DP if for every pair of neighboring datasets X ∼ X′ and for every set S ⊆ Z , we have
Pr[P(X) ∈ S ] ≤ eε · Pr[P(X′) ∈ S ] + δ,
where the probabilities are taken over the randomness in P. Here, ε ≥ 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1].
If δ = 0, then we use ε-DP for brevity and informally refer to it as pure-DP; if δ > 0, we refer to
it as approximate-DP. We will use the following post-processing property of DP.
Lemma 3.2 (Post-processing, e.g., [DR14]). If P is (ε, δ)-DP, then for every randomized function A, the
composed function A ◦ P is (ε, δ)-DP.
DP is nicely characterized by the following divergence between distributions, which will be
used throughout the paper.
Definition 3.3 (Hockey Stick Divergence). For any ε > 0, the eε-hockey stick divergence between
distributions D and D′ is defined as dε(D||D′) := ∑
x∈supp(D)
[Dx − eε · D′x]+.
We next list two useful facts about the hockey stick divergence between distributions.
Proposition 3.4. Let D and D′ be any distributions. Then, the following hold:
1. Let Dcom be another distribution. Then, for any function f , it holds that
dε( f (D ⊗Dcom)|| f (D′ ⊗Dcom)) ≤ dε(D||D′).
2. Suppose we can decompose D = ∑
i∈I
αiDi and D′ = ∑
i∈I
βiD′i , where αi’s and βi’s are tuples of
positives reals summing up to 1 and Di’s and D′i’s are distributions, then
dε(D||D′) ≤ ∑
i∈I
αi · dε+ln(βi/αi)(Di||D′i).
Proof. Item (1) follows from the post-processing property of DP, together with the definition of the
hockey stick divergence.
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To prove Item (2), we note that
dε(D||D′) = ∑
x∈supp(D)
[Dx − eε · D′x]+
= ∑
x∈supp(D)
[
∑
i∈I
αi(Di)x − eε ·
(
∑
i∈I
βi(D′i)x
)]
+
≤ ∑
i∈I
∑
x∈supp(Di)
[
αi(Di)x − eε · βi(D′i)x
]
+
≤ ∑
i∈I
αi · ∑
x∈supp(Di)
[
(Di)x − eε · βi/αi(D′i)x
]
+
≤ ∑
i∈I
αi · dε+ln(βi/αi)(Di||D′i).
3.3 Shuffle Model
We briefly review the shuffle model of DP [BEM+17, EFM+19, CSU+18]. The input to the model is
a dataset (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n, where item xi ∈ X is held by user i. A protocol P : X → Z in the
shuffle model consists of three algorithms:
• The local randomizer R : X → M∗ takes as input the data of one user, xi ∈ X , and outputs a
sequence (yi,1, . . . , yi,mi) of messages; here mi is a positive integer.
To ease discussions in the paper, we will further assume that the randomizer R pre-shuffles
its messages. That is, it applies a random permutation pi : [mi] → [mi] to the sequence
(yi,1, . . . , yi,mi) before outputting it.
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• The shuffler S : M∗ → M∗ takes as input a sequence of elements of M, say (y1, . . . , ym),
and outputs a random permutation, i.e., the sequence (ypi(1), . . . , ypi(m)), where pi ∈ Sm is a
uniformly random permutation on [m]. The input to the shuffler will be the concatenation
of the outputs of the local randomizers.
• The analyzer A : M∗ → Z takes as input a sequence of elements ofM (which will be taken
to be the output of the shuffler) and outputs an answer in Z that is taken to be the output of
the protocol P.
We will write P = (R, S, A) to denote the protocol whose components are given by R, S, and
A. The main distinction between the shuffle and local model is the introduction of the shuffler S
between the local randomizer and the analyzer. As in the local model, the analyzer is untrusted
in the shuffle model; hence privacy must be guaranteed with respect to the input to the analyzer,
i.e., the output of the shuffler. Formally, we have:
Definition 3.5 (DP in the ShuffleModel, [EFM+19, CSU+18]). A protocol P = (R, S, A) is (ε, δ)-DP
if, for any dataset X = (x1, . . . , xn), the algorithm
(x1, . . . , xn) 7→ S(R(x1), . . . , R(xn))
is (ε, δ)-DP.
11Therefore, for every x ∈ X and any two tuples z1, z2 ∈ M∗ that are equivalent up to a permutation, R(x) outputs
them with the same probability.
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Notice that the output of S(R(x1), . . . , R(xn)) can be simulated by an algorithm that takes
as input the multiset consisting of the union of the elements of R(x1), . . . , R(xn) (which we de-
note as
⋃
i
R(xi), with a slight abuse of notation) and outputs a uniformly random permutation
of them. Thus, by Lemma 3.2, it can be assumed without loss of generality for privacy analyses
that the shuffler simply outputs the multiset
⋃
i
R(xi). For the purpose of analyzing the accu-
racy of the protocol P = (R, S, A), we define its output on the dataset X = (x1, . . . , xn) to be
P(X) := A(S(R(x1), . . . , R(xn))). We also remark that the case of local DP, formalized in Defi-
nition 3.6, is a special case of the shuffle model where the shuffler S is replaced by the identity
function:
Definition 3.6 (Local DP [KLN+11]). A protocol P = (R, A) is (ε, δ)-DP in the local model (or (ε, δ)-
locally DP) if the function x 7→ R(x) is (ε, δ)-DP.
We say that the output of the protocol P on an input dataset X = (x1, . . . , xn) is P(X) :=
A(R(x1), . . . , R(xn)).
We denote DP in the shuffle model by DPshuffle, and the special case where each user can send
at most12 k messages by DPkshuffle. We denote DP in the local model by DPlocal.
Public-Coin DP. The default setting for local and shuffle models is private-coin, i.e., there is no
randomness shared between the randomizers and the analyzer. We will also study the public-coin
variants of the local and shuffle models. In the public-coin setting, each local randomizer also
takes a public random string α ← {0, 1}∗ as input. The analyzer is also given the public random
string α. We use Rα(x) to denote the local randomizer with public random string being fixed to α.
At the start of the protocol, all users jointly sample a public random string from a publicly known
distribution Dpub.
Now, we say that a protocol P = (R, A) is (ε, δ)-DP in the public-coin local model, if the function
x 7→
α←Dpub
(α, Rα(x))
is (ε, δ)-DP.
Similarly, we say that a protocol P = (R, S, A) is (ε, δ)-DP in the public-coin shuffle model, if for
any dataset X = (x1, . . . , xn), the algorithm
(x1, . . . , xn) 7→
α←Dpub
(α, S(Rα(x1), . . . , Rα(xn)))
is (ε, δ)-DP.
3.4 Useful Divergences
Wewill make use of two important divergences between distributions, the KL-divergence and the
χ2-divergence, defined as
KL(P||Q) = E
z←P
log
(
Pz
Qz
)
and χ2(P||Q) = E
z←Q
[
Pz − Qz
Qz
]2
.
12We may assume w.l.o.g. that each user sends exactly k messages; otherwise, we may define a new symbol ⊥ and
make each user sends ⊥messages so that the number of messages becomes exactly k.
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We rely on the key fact that χ2-divergence upper-bounds KL-divergence [GS02], that is,
KL(P||Q) ≤ χ2(P||Q).
We will also use Pinsker’s inequality, whereby the total variation distance lower-bounds the KL-
divergence:
KL(P||Q) ≥ 2
ln 2
‖P− Q‖2TV .
3.5 Fourier Analysis
We now review some basic Fourier analysis and then introduce two inequalities that will be heav-
ily used in our proofs. For a function f : {0, 1}D → R, its Fourier transform is given by the func-
tion fˆ (S) := E
x←UD
[ f (x) · (−1)∑i∈S xi ]. We also define ‖ f‖22 = E
x←UD
[ f (x)2]. For k ∈ N, we define the
level-k Fourier weight as Wk[ f ] := ∑
S⊆[D],|S|=k
fˆ (S)2. For convenience, for s ∈ {0, 1}D , we will also
write fˆ (s) to denote f (χs), where χs is the set {i : i ∈ [D] ∧ si = 1}. One key technical lemma is
the Level-1 Inequality from [O’D14], which was also used in [GGK+19].
Lemma 3.7 (Level-1 Inequality). Suppose f : {0, 1}D → R≥0 is a non-negative-valued function with
f (x) ∈ [0, L] for all x ∈ {0, 1}D , and E
x∼UD
[ f (x)] ≤ 1. Then,W1[ f ] ≤ 6 ln(L+ 1).
We also need the standard Parseval’s identity.
Lemma 3.8 (Parseval’s Identity). For all functions f : {0, 1}D → R,
‖ f‖22 = ∑
S⊆[D]
fˆ (S)2.
4 Low-Privacy DPlocal and DP
1
shuffle Lower Bounds for CountDistinct
In this section, we prove Theorem 1.2 and Theorem 1.4. In Section 4.1, we introduce some neces-
sary definitions and notation. In Section 4.2, we prove our lower bound for low-privacy (private-
coin) DPlocal protocols computing CountDistinct. In Section 4.3, we show the improved connec-
tion between DP1shuffle and DPlocal, which implies our lower bounds for DP
1
shuffle protocols for
CountDistinct. In Section 4.4, we describe how to adapt the proof to public-coin protocols.
4.1 Preliminaries
Recall that we use the notations ~Poi(~λ) and E[ ~Poi(~U)] to denote multi-dimensional Poisson distri-
butions and their mixtures, respectively (see Section 2.1 for the precise definitions).
We also recall the key additive property of multi-dimensional Poisson distributions: for~α,~β ∈
R
D, we have that
~Poi(~α) + ~Poi(~β) = ~Poi(~α + ~β).
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4.2 Low-Privacy DPlocal Lower Bounds for CountDistinct
We will first prove the low-privacy DPlocal lower bounds in the private-coin setting, which is cap-
tured by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1 (The Private-Coin Case of Theorem 1.2). For some ε = ln(n/Θ(log6 n)) and D =
Θ(n/ log4 n), if P is a private-coin (ε, n−ω(1))-DPlocal protocol, then it cannot solve CountDistinctn,D with
error o(D) and probability at least 0.99.
4.2.1 Technical Lemmas
Now we need the following construction from [WY19] (which uses a classical result from [Tim14,
2.11.1]).
Lemma 4.2 ([WY19]). There is a constant c such that, for all L ∈ N, there are two distributions U
and V supported on {0} ∪ [1,Λ] for Λ = c · L2, such that E[U] = E[V] = 1, U0 − V0 > 0.9, and
E[U j] = E[V j] for every j ∈ [L].
The following lemma is crucial for our proof. Its proof uses the moment matching tech-
nique [WY16, JHW18, WY19, Yan19], and can be found in Appendix A.
Lemma 4.3. Let U,V be two random variables supported on [0,Λ] such that E[U j] = E[V j] for all
j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L}, where L ≥ 1. Let D ∈ N and ~θ,~λ ∈ (R≥0)D such that ‖~θ‖1 = 1. Let D~θ be the
distribution over [D] corresponding to~θ. Suppose that
Pr
i←D~θ
[~λi ≥ 2Λ2 ·~θi] ≥ 1− 1
2Λ
.
Then,
‖E[ ~Poi(U~θ +~λ)]−E[ ~Poi(V~θ +~λ)]‖2TV ≤
1
L!
.
Finally, we need an observation that for a DPlocal protocol P solving CountDistinct, we can as-
sume without loss of generality that the analyzer of P only sees the histogram of the messages.
Lemma 4.4. For any DPlocal protocol P = (R, A) for CountDistinct, there exists an analyzer A
′ which
only sees the histogram of the messages, and achieves the same accuracy and error as that of A.
Proof. Let n be the number of users. Given the histogram, A′ first constructs a sequence of mes-
sages S ∈ Mn consistent with the histogram. Then, it applies a random permutation pi : [n] → [n]
to S to obtain a new sequence pi(S). Finally, it simply outputs A(pi(S)).
Note that applying a random permutation on themessages is equivalent to applying a random
permutation on the user inputs in the dataset. Hence, the new protocol P′ = (R, A′) is equivalent
to running P on a random permutation of the dataset. The lemma follows from the fact that a
random permutation does not change the number of distinct elements.
4.2.2 Construction of the Hard Dataset Distributions
In the rest of the section, we use n to denote a parameter controlling the number of users. The
actual number of users n¯ will be later set to a number in the interval [n, 2n]. In the following,
we fix a randomizer R : X → M which is (εR, δ)-DPlocal on n¯ users, for some εR = Θ(n¯/ log6 n¯)
to be specified later. Before constructing our two hard distributions over datasets, we set some
parameters that will be used in the construction:
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• We set L = log n and note that
1
L!
≤ 1/n4 for large enough n.
• Applying Lemma 4.2, for Λ = Θ(L2) = Θ(log2 n), we obtain two random variables U and
V supported on {0} ∪ [1,Λ], such that E[U] = E[V] = 1, U0 −V0 > 0.9, and E[U j] = E[V j]
for every j ∈ [L].
• We set Γ = 8Λ2 = Θ(log4 n) and D = n/Γ = Θ(n/ log4 n). We are going to construct
instances where inputs are from the universe X = [D].
• We set n¯ = n+ D− n0.99.
• LetW = (log2 n) · 4Λ2. We set εR so that n/2εR = W = Θ(log6 n). Hence, R is (ln(n/W), n−ω(1))-
DPlocal.
Now, for a distribution U over R≥0 and a non-empty subset E of [D], the dataset distribution
DU,E is constructed as follows:
1. For each i ∈ [D], we draw λi ← U, and ni ← Poi(λi), and add ni many users with input i.
2. For each j ∈ E, we draw mj ← Poi(n/|E|), and add mj many users with input j.13
For clarity of exposition, we will use the histogram of the protocol to denote the histogram of
the messages in the transcript of the protocol. Our goal is to show that for some “good” subset
E ⊆ [D], the following hold:
1. The distributions of the histogram of the protocol under DU,E and DV,E are very close.
2. With high probability, the number of distinct elements in datasets fromDU,E is Ω(D) smaller
than in datasets from DV,E.
Clearly, given the above two conditions and Lemma 4.4, no protocol with randomizer R can
estimate the number of distinct elements within o(D) error and with constant probability.
4.2.3 Conditions on a Good Subset E
Given a subset E, we let ~νE = ∑
i∈E
R(i) · n|E| . We also set ~µ = ∑
i∈[D]
R(i). We now specify our
conditions on a subset E ⊆ [D] being good. Let ε1 = 0.01. We say E is good if the following two
conditions hold:
1. 0 < |E| < 2ε1 · |D|.
2. For each i ∈ [D],
Pr
z←R(i)
[~νEz ≥ 2Λ2 ·~µz] ≥ 1− 1/2Λ.
We claim that a good subset E exists. In fact, we give a probabilistic construction of E that
succeeds with high probability:
Lemma 4.5. If we include each element of i ∈ [D] in E independently with probability ε1, then E is good
with probability at least 1− n−ω(1).
13Note that we here use a Poisson distribution slightly differently from the construction in Section 2 (namely,
Poi(n/|E|) instead of Poi((n−D)/|E|)) in order to simply the later calculations.
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4.2.4 The Lower Bound
Before proving Lemma 4.5, we show that for a good E, the distributions DU,E and DV,E satisfy
our desired properties, and thereby imply our DPlocal lower bound. For a dataset distribution D,
we use HistR(D) to denote the corresponding distribution of the histogram of the transcript, if all
users apply the randomizer R. For a dataset I, we use CountDistinct(I) to denote the number of
distinct elements in it.
Lemma 4.6. For a good subset E of [D], the following hold:
1. We have that
‖HistR(DU,E)− HistR(DV,E)‖TV ≤ 1/n.
2. There are two constants τ1 < τ2 such that
Pr
I1←DU,E
[CountDistinct(I1) < τ1 · D] ≥ 1− n−ω(1),
and
Pr
I2←DV,E
[CountDistinct(I2) > τ2 · D] ≥ 1− n−ω(1).
Proof.
Proof of Item (1). In the following, we use ~ν to denote ~νE for simplicity. We first construct
D vectors {~ν(i)}i∈[D] as follows: for each z ∈ M, if ~νz ≥ 2Λ2 · ~µz, then for all i ∈ [D] we set
(~ν(i))z = R(i)z · 2Λ2, otherwise we set (~ν(i))z = 0 for all i ∈ [D]. Note that for each z, we have that(
∑
i∈[D]
~ν(i)
)
z
≤ ~νz. Let ~ν(0) := ~ν−
(
∑
i∈[D]
~ν(i)
)
. By definition, it follows that ~ν(0) is a non-negative
vector. Now, HistR(DU,E) and HistR(DV,E) can be seen as distributions over histograms in NM.
Let X1,X2, . . . ,XD be D independent random variables distributed as U. By the construction of
DU,E, we have that
HistR(DU,E) = ~Poi(~ν) +
D
∑
i=1
~Poi(Xi · R(i))
= ~Poi(~ν(0)) +
D
∑
i=1
~Poi(Xi · R(i) +~ν(i)).
Similarly, let Y1,Y2, . . . ,YD be D independent random variables distributed as V. We have that
HistR(DV,E) = ~Poi(~ν(0)) +
D
∑
i=1
~Poi(Yi · R(i) +~ν(i)).
Since for each i ∈ [D], we have that
Pr
z←R(i)
[(~ν(i))z ≥ 2Λ2 · R(i)z] ≥ 1− 1/2Λ.
Applying Lemma 4.3, for each i ∈ [D], we have that
‖ ~Poi(Xi · R(i) +~ν(i))− ~Poi(Yi · R(i) +~ν(i))‖TV ≤
(
1
L!
)1/2
≤ 1/n2.
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Therefore,
‖DU,E −DV,E‖TV ≤
D
∑
i=1
‖Poi(U · R(i) +~ν(i))− Poi(V · R(i) +~ν(i))‖TV ≤ D ·
(
1
L!
)1/2
≤ 1/n.
Proof of Item (2). Let γU = E[e
−U ] and γV = E[e−V ]. By Lemma 4.2, we have that U0 ≥ 0.9,
V0 ≤ 0.1, and U,V are supported on {0} ∪ [1,Λ]. Hence, it follows that γU ≥ U0 ≥ 0.9 and
γV ≤ e−1(1−V0) +V0 · e−1 ≤ 0.5.
Now, consider the construction of DU,E. For every i ∈ [D], at least one user with input i
is added to the dataset during phase (1) with probability 1 − γU. Moreover, these events are
mutually independent. Hence, by a simple Chernoff bound, with probability at least 1− n−ω(1),
the number of distinct elements in the dataset after phase (1) is no greater than (1− γU + 0.01) ·D.
Since the second phase can add at most |E| = 0.02D many distinct elements, we can set τ1 =
1− γU + 0.03.
Similarly, for instances generated from DV,E, with probability at least 1− n−ω(1), the number
of distinct elements in the dataset after phase (1) is at least (1− γV − 0.01) · D. We can set τ2 =
1− γV − 0.01.
By our condition on γU and γV , we have that τ2 > τ1, which completes the proof.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.1. One complication is that datasets from DU,E and
DV,E may not have the same number of users. We address this issue by “throwing out” extra
users randomly and obtain distributions over datasets with exactly n¯ many users.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Consider the DU,E and DV,E. By a simple Chernoff bound, we have that with
probability at least 1− n−ω(1), the number of users lies in [n+ D− n0.99, n+ D+ n0.99].
Recall that n¯ = n + D − n0.99. We construct the distribution D¯U,E as follows: to generate
a dataset from D¯U,E, we take a sample dataset I from DU,E, and if there are nI > n¯ users in
I, we delete nI − n¯ users uniformly at random, and output I. We similarly construct another
distribution D¯V,E. Note that with probability at least 1− n−ω(1), we delete at most 2n0.99 users in
the construction of D¯U,E (as well as in that of D¯V,E).
Now, both D¯U,E and D¯V,E output datasets with exactly n¯ users with probability 1− n−ω(1).
This means that if there is a protocol solving CountDistinct with n¯ users with error o(D), then by
Lemma 4.4, Item (2) of Lemma 4.6 and since 2n0.99 = o(D), the analyzer of the protocol should be
able to distinguishHistR(D¯U,E) and HistR(D¯V,E)with at least a constant probability. Therefore, we
have that
‖HistR(D¯U,E)−HistR(D¯V,E)‖TV = Ω(1).
On the other hand, HistR(D¯U,E) (respectively, HistR(D¯V,E)) can also be constructed by taking
a sample from HistR(DU,E) (respectively, HistR(DV,E)) and throwing out some random messages
until at most n¯ messages remain. Since post-processing does not increase statistical distance, by
Item (1) of Lemma 4.6, we have that
‖HistR(D¯U,E)−HistR(D¯V,E)‖TV ≤ ‖HistR(DU,E)− HistR(DV,E)‖TV ≤ 1/n,
a contradiction.
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4.2.5 A Probabilistic Construction of Good E
We need the following proposition for the proof of Lemma 4.5.
Proposition 4.7. Let R : X →M be an (ε, δ)-DPlocal randomizer. For every i, j ∈ X , it follows that
Pr
z←R(i)
[R(i)z ≥ 2eε · R(j)z] ≤ 2δ.
Proof. Let T be the set {z : R(i)z ≥ 2eε · R(j)z ∧ z ∈ M}. Since R is (ε, δ)-DPlocal, it follows that
R(i)T ≤ eε · R(j)T + δ.
By the definition of the set T , it follows that
R(j)T = ∑
z∈T
R(j)z ≤ 1
2eε
· ∑
z∈T
R(i)z =
1
2eε
· R(i)T .
Putting the above two inequalities together, we have
R(i)T ≤ 1
2
· R(i)T + δ,
which in turn implies that
Pr
z←R(i)
[R(i)z ≥ 2eε · R(j)z] = R(i)T ≤ 2δ.
Finally, we prove Lemma 4.5 (restated below).
Lemma 4.5. (restated) If we include each element i ∈ [D] in E independently with probability ε1 = 0.01,
then E is good with probability at least 1− n−ω(1).
Proof. Let Esize be the event that 0 < |E| < 2ε1 · |D|. By a simple Chernoff bound, it follows that
Pr
E
[Esize] ≥ 1− exp(−Ω(|D|)) ≥ 1− n−ω(1).
Therefore, the first condition for E being good is satisfied with probability 1 − n−ω(1). In the
following, we will condition on the event Esize.
Recall that ~νE = ∑
i∈E
R(i) · n|E| and ~µ = ∑
i∈[D]
R(i). In the rest of the proof, we will focus on the
second condition for E being good, namely that for each i ∈ [D], it is the case that
Pr
z←R(i)
[~νEz ≥ 2Λ2 ·~µz] ≥ 1− 1/2Λ.
In the following, we fix i ∈ [D], and show that the previous inequality holds for i with high
probability. Therefore, we can then conclude that E is good with high probability by a union
bound.
We also let ~m∗ ∈ RM be such that ~m∗z = max
i∈[D]
R(i)z for all z ∈ M. Now, for z ∈ M, if
~µz ≤ ~m∗z · log2 n, we say z is light; otherwise we say z is heavy.
We define
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Elight :=
[
Pr
z←R(i)
[~νEz < 2Λ
2 ·~µz and z is light] ≤ 1/4Λ
]
,
and
Eheavy :=
[
Pr
z←R(i)
[~νEz < 2Λ
2 ·~µz and z is heavy] ≤ 1/4Λ
]
.
It suffices to show that both Pr
E
[Elight|Esize] and Pr
E
[Eheavy|Esize] are very large. Note that ~νE is not
defined when |E| = 0. But since we only care about Pr
E
[Elight|Esize] and Pr
E
[Eheavy|Esize], this corner
case is excluded by conditioning on Esize.
Proving that Pr
E
[Elight|Esize] = 1. By Proposition 4.7 and the fact that R is (ln(n/W), n−ω(1))-
DPlocal, for every x ∈ [D]
Pr
z←R(i)
[R(i)z ≥ (2n/W) · R(x)z] ≤ n−ω(1).
By a union bound over all elements in E, we have that
Pr
z←R(i)
[R(i)z ≥ (2n/W) · ~νz
n
] ≤ n−ω(1),
which is equivalent to
Pr
z←R(i)
[~νz ≤W/2 · R(i)z] ≤ n−ω(1).
Similarly, for j ∈ [D], we also have that
Pr
z←R(j)
[~νz ≤W/2 · R(j)z] ≤ n−ω(1).
Again since R is (ln(n/W), n−ω(1))-DPlocal, we have that
Pr
z←R(i)
[~νz ≤W/2 · R(j)z] = E
z←R(j)
R(i)z
R(j)z
· 1[~νz ≤W/2 · R(j)z]
≤ E
z←R(j)
(2n/W) · 1
[
R(i)z
R(j)z
≤ 2n/W
]
· 1[~νz ≤W/2 · R(j)z] + E
z←R(j)
R(i)z
R(j)z
· 1
[
R(i)z
R(j)z
> 2n/W
]
≤(2n/W) · n−ω(1) + E
z←R(i)
1
[
R(i)z
R(j)z
> 2n/W
]
≤n−ω(1).
Therefore, by a union bound over j ∈ [D],
Pr
z←R(i)
[~νz ≤W/2 · ~m∗z ] ≤ n−ω(1).
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Now we are ready to prove that Pr
E
[Elight|Esize] = 1. We will show that Elight holds for every
nonempty E. We have that
Pr
z←R(i)
[~νEz < 2Λ
2 ·~µz and z is light]
≤ Pr
z←R(i)
[~νEz < 2Λ
2 ·~µz and z is light and~νz > W/2 · ~m∗z ] + Pr
z←R(i)
[~νz ≤W/2 · ~m∗z ]
≤ Pr
z←R(i)
[~νEz < 2Λ
2 ·~µz and ~µz ≤ ~m∗z · log2 n and~νz >W/2 · ~m∗z ] + n−ω(1)
(z is light implies ~µz ≤ ~m∗z · log2 n)
≤n−ω(1).
The last inequality follows from the fact that ~µz ≤ ~m∗z · log2 n and ~νz > W/2 · ~m∗z together imply
that ~νz > W/2 · ~m∗z ≥
W/2
log2 n
~µz ≥ 2Λ2 · ~µz (recall that W = log2 4Λ2). Hence Pr
z←R(i)
[~νEz < 2Λ
2 ·
~µz and ~µz ≤ ~m∗z · log2 n and~νz >W/2 · ~m∗z ] = 0 as the three inequalities cannot be simultaneously
satisfied.
Proving that Pr[Eheavy|Esize] is large. Now, for a heavy z, we have that ~µz ≥ ~m∗z · log2 n. In
particular, fix a heavy z, and define the random variable Xi := 1[i ∈ E] · R(i)z for each i ∈ [D].
Note that the Xi’s are independent variables over [0, R(i)z] and E
[
∑
i∈[D]
Xi
]
= ε1 · ~µz. Letting
S = ∑
i∈[D]
Xi, by Hoeffding’s inequality, we have that
Pr
E
[|S−E[S]| ≥ 1
2
E[S]] ≤ 2 exp
(
−2 · (
1
2 E[S])
2
∑i∈[D] R(i)2z
)
.
Note that
∑
i∈[D]
R(i)2z ≤ ∑
i∈[D]
R(i)z · ~m∗z ≤ ~µz · ~m∗z .
Plugging in, it follows that
Pr
E
[S ≤ ε1~µz/2] ≤ 2 exp
(
− ε
2
1~µ
2
z/2
~µz · ~m∗z
)
≤ 2 exp(−ε21/2 · log2 n) ≤ n−ω(1).
Note that~νEz = S ·
n
|E| , and that |E| ≤ 2ε1D with probability at least 1− n
−ω(1). By a union bound,
we have that ~νEz ≥ ε1~µz/2 ·
n
2ε1D
= ~µz · Γ/4 with probability at least 1 − n−ω(1). Noting that
Γ/4 = 2Λ2, we have that
E
E
[
Pr
z←R(i)
[~νEz < 2Λ
2 ·~µz ∧ z is heavy]
]
≤ n−ω(1).
Recall that Pr[Esize] ≥ 1− n−ω(1). By Markov’s inequality, we have Pr[Eheavy|Esize] ≥ 1− n−ω(1).
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4.3 DP1shuffle Implies DPlocal with Stronger Privacy Bound
In this section, we prove a stronger connection between DP1shuffle and DPlocal than previously
known. Together with Theorem 4.1, it implies the private-coin version of Theorem 1.4.
We first need a technical lemma which gives a lower bound on the hockey stick divergence
between Ber(α) + Bin(m, p) and Ber(β) + Bin(m, p). We defer its proof to Appendix B.
Lemma 4.8. There exists an absolute constant c0 such that, for every integer m ≥ 1, three reals α, β, ε > 0
such that α > eεβ, letting ∆ = α− eεβ and supposing 4e
ε
∆
β < 1/2, it holds that
dε(Ber(α) + Bin(m, β)||Ber(β) + Bin(m, β)) ≥ ∆ · 1
2
√
2m
· exp
(
−c0 ·m · e
ε
∆
β ·
[
log(∆−1) + 1
])
.
We are now ready to prove the main lemma of this subsection.
Lemma 4.9. For all ε = O(1), there is a constant c > 0 such that for all δ ≤ δ0 ≤ 1/n if the randomizer
R is (ε, δ)-DP1shuffle on n users, then R is
(
ln
(
n
/ c ln δ−1
ln δ−10
)
, δ0
)
-DPlocal.
Proof. Let ε = O(1). Note that we can assume that δ ≤ δω(1)0 ≤ n−ω(1), as otherwise
ln δ−1
ln δ−10
≤ O(1)
and in this case the theorem follows directly from the fact that R is (ε + ln n, δ)-DPlocal [CSU
+18].
Suppose that R is (ε, δ)-DP1shuffle on n users. Let c be a constant to be fixed later, D = n
/ c ln δ−1
ln δ−10
and E ⊆M be an event. Our goal is to show that
R(x)E ≤ R(y)E · D+ δ0,
for all x, y ∈ X .
Fix two x, y ∈ X . Let α = R(x)E and β = R(y)E. Note that without loss of generality we can
assume that β ≤ 1/D, as otherwise clearly α ≤ 1 ≤ D · β + δ0.
LetW1 = xy
n−1 and W2 = yn be two neighboring datasets, and X,Y be the random variables
corresponding to the number of occurrences of the event E in the transcript, when running the
protocol with randomizer R on datasetsW1 andW2, respectively.
From the assumption that R is (ε, δ)-DP1shuffle, we have dε(HistR(W1)||HistR(W2)) ≤ δ. Then,
by the post-processing property of DP (Lemma 3.2), it follows that dε(X||Y) ≤ δ.
We have that
X = Ber(α) + Bin(n− 1, β) and Y = Ber(β) + Bin(n− 1, β).
The goal now is to show that if α > β · D + δ0, then X and Y do not satisfy (ε, δ)-DP (i.e.,
dε(X||Y) > δ), thus obtaining a contradiction.
Now, assume that α > D · β + δ0. Since ε = O(1), we have that ∆ = α− eεβ > D
2
· β + δ0. Note
that 4
eε
∆
β = O(D−1) < 1/2.
Letting m = n− 1 and applying Lemma 4.8 for a universal constant c0, it follows that
dε(Ber(α) + Bin(m, β)||Ber(β) + Bin(m, β)) ≥ ∆ · 1
2
√
2m
· exp
(
−c0 ·m · e
ε
∆
β ·
[
log(∆−1) + 1
])
.
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Noting that ε = O(1), we have that
m · e
ε
∆
β ·
[
log(∆−1) + 1
]
≤ O
(
m
1
Dβ
· β · log δ−10
)
= O(c ln δ−1).
We now set the constant c to be small enough so that
c0 ·m · e
ε
∆
β ·
[
log(∆−1) + 1
]
≤ 1
2
ln δ−1.
Plugging in and recalling that δ ≤ δω(1)0 ≤ n−ω(1), we get that
dε(X||Y) = dε(Ber(α) + Bin(m, β)||Ber(β) + Bin(m, β)) ≥ δ0 · 1
2
√
2m
√
δ > δ,
a contradiction.
Finally, we are ready to prove our DP1shuffle lower bound for CountDistinct in the private-coin
case.
Theorem 4.10. For all ε = O(1), there are δ = 2−Θ(log
8 n) and D = Θ(n/ log4 n) such that no private-
coin (ε, δ)-DP1shuffle protocol on n users can solve CountDistinctn,D with error o(D) and probability at least
0.99.
Proof. We set δ0 = 2
− log2 n and δ = 2−c log
8 n for a constant c to be specified shortly. By Theorem 4.1,
it follows that the corresponding randomizer R is (ln(Θ(n/c log6 n), n−ω(1))-DPlocal. Setting c to
be sufficiently large and combining with Theorem 4.1 completes the proof.
4.4 Generalizing to Public-Coin Protocols
Finally, we generalize our proof for the private-coin case to the public-coin case, and prove Theo-
rem 1.4 (restated below).
Theorem 1.4. (restated) For all ε = O(1), there are δ = 2−Θ(log
8 n) and D = Θ(n/ log4 n) such that no
public-coin (ε, δ)-DP1shuffle protocol on n users can solve CountDistinctn,D with error o(D) and probability
at least 0.99.
Fix R to be a public-coin randomizer with public randomness α from distributionDpub. We first
generalize Lemma 4.9, and show that if R is DP1shuffle, then with high probability over α ← Dpub,
Rα satisfies the similar DPlocal guarantee as in Lemma 4.9.
Lemma 4.11. For all ε = O(1), there is a constant c > 0 such that for all δ ≤ δ0 ≤ 1/n if the
public-coin randomizer R : X → M with public randomness distribution Dpub is (ε, δ)-DP1shuffle on n
users, and if |X | ≤ n, then with probability at least 1 − δ0 over α ← Dpub, it is the case that Rα is(
ln
(
n
/ c ln δ−1
ln δ−10
)
, δ0
)
-DPlocal.
Proof Sketch. Similar to the proof of Lemma 4.9, we can assume that δ ≤ δω(1)0 ≤ n−ω(1) without
loss of generality.
By the definition of public-coin (ε, δ)-DP in the shuffle model, for every two neighboring
datasetsW1 andW2, we have that
E
α←Dpub
[dε(HistRα(W1)||HistRα(W2))] ≤ δ.
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Observe that the proof of Lemma 4.9 only considers the |X |2 pairs of neighboring datasets of
the formW1 = xy
n−1 andW2 = yn for all x, y ∈ X . We useWgood to denote the set of such pairs.
Using the assumption that |X | ≤ n, we have that
E
α←Dpub ∑(W1,W2)∈Wgood
[dε(HistRα(W1)||HistRα(W2))] ≤ |X |2δ ≤ n2δ.
Thus, by Markov’s inequality, with probability at least 1− δ0 over α ← Dpub, we have that
∑
(W1,W2)∈Wgood
[dε(HistRα(W1)||HistRα(W2))] ≤ n2δ/δ0 ≤ δ0.9,
where the last inequality follows from our assumption that δ ≤ δω(1)0 ≤ n−ω(1). We say an α is
good if it satisfies the above inequality. In particular, for all good α and all pairs (W1,W2) ∈ Wgood,
we have that
dε(HistRα(W1)||HistRα(W2)) ≤ δ0.9.
The proof of Lemma 4.9 then implies that Rα is
(
ln
(
n
/ c ln δ−1
ln δ−10
)
, δ0
)
-DPlocal, for a constant c
depending on ε.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 1.4.
Proof of Theorem 1.4. We use D¯U,E and D¯V,E to denote the same distributions constructed in the
proof of Theorem 4.10. We moreover use the same notation as in Section 4.2.
By a simple application of Markov’s inequality and noting that our assumed protocol solves
CountDistinctn,D with error o(D) and probability at least 0.99, it follows that with probability at
least 0.9 over α ← Dpub, if |E| ≤ 0.02 · |D|, then
‖HistRα(D¯U,E)−HistRα(D¯V,E)‖TV = Ω(1).
By Lemma 4.11, with probability at least 1− δ0 over α ← Dpub, we have that Rα is
(
ln
(
n
/ c ln δ−1
ln δ−10
)
, δ0
)
-
DPlocal. We say that such an α is good.
For all good α and for a good subset E, when the randomizer is set to Rα (note that the defi-
nition of a good subset depends on the randomizer R), by a similar argument as in Theorem 4.10,
we have
‖HistRα(D¯U,E)− HistRα(D¯V,E)‖TV = o(1).
Now, by Lemma 4.5, if we construct E by including each element of D with probability 0.01,
then for every good α, we know that E is good for randomizer Rα with probability at least 1−
n−ω(1). By a union bound, there exists a fixed choice of E such that E is good for randomizer Rα
with probability at least 1− 1/n over α ← Dpub. In the following, we fix E to be such a choice.
Finally, by a union bound, it follows that with probability at least 0.9− δ0− 1/n > 0, the above
two inequalities hold simultaneously, a contradiction.
Theorem 1.2 follows exactly using a similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 1.4 (in fact, it
is simpler in the local case because there is no need to apply Lemma 4.11).
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5 (ε, δ)-Dominated Algorithms
In [CSU+18], it was shown that an (ε, δ)-DP1shuffle protocol on n users is also (ε + ln n, δ)-DPlocal,
thereby reducing the problem of proving lower bounds for DP1shuffle protocols to proving lower
bounds on DPlocal protocols with low privacy properties. However, it is known that such a con-
nection does not hold even for DP2shuffle protocols [BC20, Section 4.1].
Recall the definition of (ε, δ)-dominated algorithms from Definition 1.7. In this section, we will
show that DPkshuffle protocols are dominated.
For clarity of exposition, we will assume that each user sends exactly k messages; this is with-
out loss of generality (see Footnote 12). To handle public-coin protocols, we need a relaxed version
of dominated algorithms.
Definition 5.1 (Dominated Algorithms). For a distribution µ on X , we say an algorithm R is
(ε, δ, µ)-dominated, if for the distribution Dµ = E
x←µ R(x), there exists a distribution D onM
k such
that
dε
(Dµ||D) ≤ δ.
In this case, we also say R is (ε, δ, µ)-dominated by D.
5.1 Approximate-DPshuffle Protocols are Dominated
Next we show that approximate DPshuffle protocols are dominated. For this purpose, we intro-
duce the concept of “pseudo-locally private” algorithms, which is a special case of dominated
algorithms, and may be interesting in its own right.
5.1.1 Merged Randomizer
Let Bn,k be the set of all k-sized subsets of the set [n]× [k]. For F ∈ Bn,k and a randomizer R, we
define the merged randomizer of R with respect to F , denoted by RF , as follows:
RF (x)
• Given an input x, for each j ∈ [n], we simulate R(x) with independent random coins to
get an output wj ∈ Mk.
• Assume that F consists of elements (x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk) ∈ [n] × [k] indexed in lexico-
graphical order. We construct a k-tuple z ∈ Mk such that zi = (wxi)yi for each i ∈ [k].
• We pre-shuffle z before outputting it. That is, we draw a permutation pi : [k] → [k]
uniformly at random, shuffle z according to pi to obtain a new k-tuple z˜ (by setting z˜i =
zpi(i) for each i ∈ [k]), and output z˜.
That is, RF (x) runs R(x) several times, and merges the obtained outputs according to F . We
now define a distribution Dn,k on Bn,k as follows: to draw a sample from Dn,k, we simply draw k
items {(xi, yi)}i∈[k] without replacement from the set [n]× [k].
Finally, for a randomizer R, we define the randomizer Rrand as follows: Given an input x, we
first draw F from Dn,k, and then simulate RF on the input x and output its output.
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5.1.2 Pseudo-Locally Private Algorithms
We are now ready to define pseudo-locally private algorithms.
Definition 5.2. We say that an algorithm R is (ε, δ)-pseudo-locally private, if for all x, y ∈ X and all
E ⊆ Mk,
Pr[R(x) ∈ E] ≤ eε · Pr[Rrand(y) ∈ E] + δ.
Remark 5.3. If R is (ε, δ)-pseudo-locally private, then clearly R is also (ε, δ)-dominated; we can simply
take D = Rrand(y∗) for any fixed y∗.
5.1.3 Multi-Message DPshuffle Protocols are Pseudo-Locally Private
Our most crucial observation here is an analogue of [CSU+18, Theorem 6.2] for multi-message
DPshuffle protocols. Namely, we show that any multi-message DPshuffle protocol is pseudo-locally
private.
Lemma 5.4. If R is (ε, δ)-DPkshuffle on n users, then it is (ε + k(1+ ln n), δ) pseudo-locally private.
Proof. Suppose otherwise, i.e., that there are x, y and E ⊆Mk such that
Pr[R(x) ∈ E] > (en)keε · E
F←Dn,k
[
Pr
[
RF (y) ∈ E
]]
+ δ.
Note that since both R and RF pre-shuffle their outputs before outputting them, we can assume
that E is a union of equivalence classes of k-tuples (we say two k-tuples u, v ∈ Mk are equivalent
if v can be obtained by u via applying a permutation).14
Consider two datasets X0 = y
n and X1 = y
n−1x. Let P be the corresponding DPshuffle protocol
with randomizer R. For a dataset X, we use PR(X) to denote the random variable of the transcript
of P before shuffling. That is, for a dataset X = (xi)i∈[n], PR(X) is the concatenation of all R(Xi)
for i from 1 to n.
We now define an event E as “there exist k messages in the transcript of P constituting the
event E”. It immediately follows that
Pr[PR(X1) ∈ E ] ≥ Pr[R(x) ∈ E]. (2)
Furthermore, we claim that
Pr[PR(X0) ∈ E ] ≤
(
kn
k
)
· E
F←Dn,k
[
Pr
[
RF (y) ∈ E
]]
. (3)
To see why the above inequality holds, note that if we pick k messages from PR(X0), depending
on which users these messages come from, the probability that they constitute E is bounded by
Pr[RF (y) ∈ E] for a certain F ∈ Bn,k.
Moreover, if we pick these k messages uniformly at random from all
(
kn
k
)
possible k-tuples,
the corresponding F is distributed according to Dn,k. Therefore, we can apply a union bound
over all
(
kn
k
)
possible k-tuples and sum up the corresponding Pr[RF (y) ∈ E] to obtain an upper
14Too see this, we can take E to be {z : R(x)z > (en)keεRrand(y)z ∧ z ∈ Mk}. One can see that if u and v are equivalent
up to a permutation, then either both u and v are in E, or neither of them is in E.
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bound on Pr[PR(X0) ∈ E ]. The aforementioned sum is precisely
(
kn
k
)
times the expectation
E
F←Dn,k
[
Pr
[
RF (y) ∈ E
]]
.
Since
(
kn
k
)
≤ (en)k, we may combine (2) and (3) to obtain
Pr[PR(X1) ∈ E ] > eε · Pr[PR(X0) ∈ E ] + δ. (4)
Finally, note that applying a random permutation to the transcript does not change whether
the event E occurs. Therefore, (4) contradicts the assumption that R is (ε, δ)-DPshuffle.
From Remark 5.3, we get the following corollary:
Corollary 5.5. If R is (ε, δ)-DPkshuffle on n users, then it is (ε + k(1+ ln n), δ)-dominated.
Next, we generalize Corollary 5.5 to the public-coin case:
Lemma 5.6. If R is (ε, δ)-DPkshuffle in the n-user public-coin setting with public randomness from Dpub
and τ = ε + k(1+ ln n), then there is a family of distributions {Dα}α∈supp(Dpub) over Mk such that for
every distribution µ over X ,
E
α←Dpub
dτ
(
E
x←µ Rα(x)||Dα
)
≤ δ.
In other words, there are reals {δα}α∈supp(Dpub) such that Eα←Dpub[δα] ≤ δ and Rα is (τ, δα, µ)-dominated
by Dα.
Proof. From the proof of Lemma 5.4, it follows that for all x, y ∈ X and α ∈ supp(Dpub), we have
that
dτ(Rα(x)||Rrandα (y)) ≤ dε(PRα(xyn−1)||PRα(yn)).
Since R is (ε, δ)-DPshuffle on n users, it follows that
E
α←Dpub
[dε(PRα(xy
n−1)||PRα(yn))] ≤ δ.
Putting the above two inequalities together, for all x, y ∈ X , we get that
E
α←Dpub
[dτ(Rα(x)||Rrandα (y))] ≤ δ.
We now finish the proof by fixing y∗ ∈ X , and setting Dα = Rrandα (y∗) for every α ∈ supp(Dpub).
5.2 Bounding KL Divergence for Dominated Randomizers
In this subsection, we prove the technical lemma bounding average-case KL divergences for dom-
inated randomizers.
As before, we use X andM to denote the input space and the message space respectively. For
a local randomizer R : X →M, we let px,z = Pr[R(x) = z].
Let µ be a distribution on X . Let I be an index set, pi be a distribution on I , and {λv}v∈I be a
family of distributions on X . For a constant τ, we say that µ τ-dominates {λv} if for all x ∈ X and
v ∈ I , it holds that (λv)x ≤ τ · µx.
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Theorem 5.7. For a constant τ ≥ 2, let µ be a distribution which τ-dominates a distribution family
{λv}v∈I . Let pi be a distribution on I . Let W : R → R be a concave function such that for all functions
ψ : X → R≥0 satisfying ψ(µ) ≤ 1, it holds that
E
v←pi
[
(ψ(λv)− ψ(µ))2
] ≤W(‖ψ‖∞).
Then for an (ε, δ, µ)-dominated randomizer R, it holds that
E
v←pi[KL(R(λv)||R(µ))] ≤ 2W(2e
ε) + 4(τ − 1)2 · δ.
Proof. Let Q = R(µ). Recall that px,z = Pr[R(x) = z]. We also set qz = Pr[Q = z] and fz(x) =
px,z
qz
.
It follows from the assumption that there exists a distribution qD that (ε, δ, µ)-dominates R.
Noting that χ2-divergence upper-bounds KL divergence (see Section 3.4), it follows that
E
v←pi KL(R(λv)||Q) ≤ Ev←pi χ
2(R(λv)||Q)
≤ E
v←pi Ez←Q
[
R(λv)z − qz
qz
]2
= E
z←Q
E
v←pi [ fz(λv)− 1]
2
.
We will further decompose fz = gz + hz so that ‖gz‖∞ is small and E
z←Q
hz(µ) is small. Formally,
for each z ∈ M, we define a truncation level
Lz =
2eε · qDz
qz
.
Then, we define gz and hz as follows
gz(x) :=
{
fz(x) if fz(x) ≤ Lz,
0 otherwise,
and hz(x) := fz(x)− gz(x).
Fix a z in the support of Q. Noting that
gz(µ) + hz(µ) = fz(µ) =
Ex←µ[px,z]
qz
= 1,
we get
E
v←pi [ fz(λv)− 1]
2 = E
v←pi [(gz(λv)− gz(µ)) + (hz(λv)− hz(µ))]
2
≤ 2 · E
v←pi[(gz(λv)− gz(µ))
2] + 2 · E
v←pi[(hz(λv)− hz(µ))
2]. (5)
To simplify the notation, in the following we set gˆz(λv) := gz(λv)− gz(µ) and hˆz(λv) = hz(λv)−
hz(µ). We will bound the two terms in (5) separately.
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Bounding E
v←pi gˆz(λv)
2. Since W is concave, noting that ‖gz‖∞ ≤ Lz and gz(µ) ≤ 1, it follows
that
E
z←Q
E
v←pi gˆz(λv)
2 ≤ E
z←Q
W(Lz) ≤W
(
E
z←Q
Lz
)
,
where the second step uses Jensen’s inequality. From the definition of Lz, we have that
E
z←Q
Lz = ∑
z
qz · 2e
ε · qDz
qz
= 2eε ·∑
z
qDz = 2e
ε,
where the last equality follows from the fact that qD is a distribution. We therefore obtain
E
z←Q
E
v←pi gˆz(λv)
2 ≤W(2eε).
Bounding E
v←pi hˆz(λv)
2. Since µ τ-dominates {λv}, it follows that
|hˆz(λv)| = |hz(λv)− hz(µ)| ≤ max {hz(µ), τ · hz(µ)− hz(µ)} ≤ (τ − 1)hz(µ).
Therefore,
E
z←Q
E
v←pi hˆz(λv)
2 ≤ (τ − 1)2 · E
z←Q
hz(µ)
2 ≤ (τ − 1)2 · E
z←Q
hz(µ),
where the last inequality holds because hz(µ) ≤ 1.
By the definition of hz, it follows that
E
z←Q
hz(µ) = ∑
z∈M
E
x←µ
[
px,z · 1[ fz(x) > Lz]
]
.
Let Tx = {z ∈ M : fz(x) > Lz}. For z ∈ Tx, we get that
px,z > Lz · qz
>
2eε · qDz
qz
· qz = 2 · eε · qDz .
In particular, the above means that E
x←µ px,Tx ≤ 2δ, as otherwise
E
x←µ[px,Tx ]− e
ε · qDTx ≥ Ex←µ[px,Tx ]/2 > δ,
contradicting the fact that R is (ε, δ, µ)-dominated by qD . Hence, we have
E
z←Q
hz(µ) = ∑
z∈M
E
x←µ
[
px,z · 1[ fz(x) > Lz]
]
= E
x←µ px,Tx ≤ 2δ.
Putting everything together, it follows that
E
z←Q
E
v←pi hˆz(λv)
2 ≤ 2(τ − 1)2 · δ.
Final Bound. Combining our bounds on E
z←Q
E
v←pi gˆz(α)
2 and E
z←Q
E
v←pi hˆz(λv)
2, we conclude that
E
v←pi[KL(R(λv)||R(µ))] ≤ 2W(2e
ε) + 4(τ − 1)2 · δ.
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6 Lower Bounds for Selection and ParityLearning
In this section, we prove lower bounds for Selection and ParityLearning in the DPshuffle model. We
begin with some notation.
6.1 Notation
For (ℓ, s) ∈ [2]× {0, 1}D , let Dℓ,s be the uniform distribution on {x ∈ {0, 1}D : 〈x, s〉 = ℓ}. Recall
that UD is the uniform distribution on {0, 1}D .
For j ∈ [D], let ej be the D-bit string such that only the j-th bit is 1, and the other bits are 0. For
(ℓ, j) ∈ [2]× [D], we denote by Dℓ,e j the uniform distribution on all length-D Boolean strings with
j-th bit being ℓ. For simplicity, we also use Dℓ,j to denoteDℓ,e j when the context is clear.
We need the following simple proposition.
Proposition 6.1. For every function f : {0, 1}D → R and s ∈ {0, 1}D ,
fˆ (s) =
1
2
( f (D0,s)− f (D1,s)).
Proof. By definition, we have that
fˆ (s) = E
x←UD
(−1)〈s,x〉 f (x) = 1
2
( f (D0,s)− f (D1,s)).
6.2 Lower Bound for Selection
We begin with lower bounds for Selection.
Lemma 6.2. For ε > 0, suppose R is (ε, δ,UD)-dominated, then we have
E
(ℓ,j)∈[2]×[D]
[KL(R(Dℓ,j)||R(UD))] ≤ O
( ε
D
+ δ
)
.
Proof. To apply Theorem 5.7, we set the index set as I = [2]× [D], the distribution pi to the uniform
distribution over I , {λv}v∈I = {Dv}v∈I , and µ = UD.
Clearly, µ 2-dominates {λv}. Let f be a function such that ‖ f‖∞ = L and f (µ) ≤ 1, it follows
that
E
v←pi( f (µ)− f (λv))
2 = E
(ℓ,j)∈[2]×[D]
( f (Dℓ,j)− f (UD))2
= E
(ℓ,j)∈[2]×[D]
1
4
( f (Dℓ,j)− f (D1−ℓ,j))2
= E
(ℓ,j)∈[2]×[D]
fˆ ({j})2. (Proposition 6.1)
By Lemma 3.7, it follows that
E
v←pi( f (µ)− f (λv))
2 = E
(ℓ,j)∈[2]×[D]
fˆ ({j})2 ≤ O
(
ln L
D
)
.
Therefore, we can setW(L) :=
C · ln L
D
for a large enough constant C and note thatW is a concave
function. By Theorem 5.7, it follows that
E
(ℓ,j)∈[2]×[D]
[KL(R(Dℓ,j)||R(UD))] ≤ O(W(2eε) + δ) ≤ O
( ε
D
+ δ
)
.
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Lemma 6.3. For a public-coin randomizer R with public randomness from Dpub, if there is a family of
distributions {Dα}α∈supp(Dpub) overMk such that
E
α←Dpub
dε
(
E
x←UD
Rα(x)||Dα
)
≤ o(1/D),
then a public-coin protocol with randomizer R needs at least Ω
(
D logD
ε
)
samples to solve Selection with
probability at least 0.99.
Proof. Let L, J be uniformly random over [2] × [D], and X1,X2, . . . ,Xn be n i.i.d. samples from
DL,J. For each i ∈ [n], we draw Zi from R(Xi).
Let Pα(Z1,Z2, . . . ,Zn) be the output of the protocol with public randomness fixed to α, and let
Fα(Z1,Z2, . . . ,Zn) := (1, Pα(Z1,Z2, . . . ,Zn)). Assuming n ≥ Θ(logD), it follows that Fα(Z1,Z2, . . . ,Zn) =
(L, J) with probability at least 0.99− 0.01 ≥ 0.98 over the randomness of α ← Dpub and random-
ness in Fα, conditioned on the event L = 1.
ByMarkov’s inequality, with probability at least 0.8 over α ← Dpub, we have that Fα(Z1,Z2, . . . ,Zn) =
(L, J) with probability at least 0.8 over the randomness in Fα conditioned on the event L = 1.
From our assumption and Markov’s inequality, it follows that with probability at least 0.99
over α ← Dpub, we have dε
(
E
x←UD
Rα(x)||Dα
)
≤ o(1/D). That is, Rα is (ε, o(1/D),UD)-dominated.
By a union bound, with probability at least 0.99− 0.2 > 0 over α ← Dpub, we have Fα(Z1,Z2, . . . ,Zn) =
(L, J) with probability at least 0.8/2 ≥ 0.4, and Rα is (ε, o(1/D),UD)-dominated. In the following,
we fix such an α.
By Lemma 6.2, for β ≤ O
( ε
D
)
, we have that
E
(ℓ,j)∈[2]×[D]
[KL(Rα(Dℓ,j)||Rα(UD))] ≤ β.
By Fano’s inequality,
Pr[Fα(Z1,Z2, . . . ,Zn) = (L, J)] ≤ 1+ I((Z1,Z2, . . . ,Zn); (L, J))
log 2D
≤ 1+ n · I(Z1; (L, J))
log 2D
.
We also have that
I(Z1; (L, J)) = KL((Z1, L, J)||Z1 ⊗ (L, J)) = E
L,J←[2]×[D]
KL((Z1|L, J)||Z1)
= E
L,J←[2]×[D]
KL(R(DL,J)||R(UD))
≤ β.
Plugging in, we obtain
1+ n · β
log 2D
≥ Pr[F(Z1,Z2, . . . ,Zn) = (L, J)] ≥ 0.4.
Hence, we deduce that n = Ω(logD · β−1) = Ω
(
D logD
ε
)
.
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We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.9 (restated below).
Theorem 1.9. (restated) For any ε = O(1), if P is a public-coin (ε, o(1/D))-DPkshuffle protocol solving
Selection with probability at least 0.99, then n ≥ Ω
(
D
k
)
.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that n ≤ poly(D). Applying Lemma 5.6 and letting
τ = ε + k(1+ ln n), we get that
E
α←Dpub
dτ
(
E
x←UD
Rα(x)||Dα
)
≤ δ,
for a distribution family {Dα}α∈supp(Dpub).
Therefore, by Lemma 6.3, it follows that n ≥ Ω
(
D logD
τ
)
= Ω
(
D
k
)
.
6.3 Lower Bound for ParityLearning
We next prove our lower bound for ParityLearning.
Lemma 6.4. For ε > 0, suppose R is (ε, δ,UD)-dominated. We have that
E
ℓ,s∈[2]×{0,1}D
[KL(R(Dℓ,s)||R(UD))] ≤ 4e
ε
2D
+ 4δ.
Proof. To apply Theorem 5.7, we set the index set as I = [2] × {0, 1}D , distribution pi to be the
uniform distribution over I , {λv}v∈I = {Dv}v∈I , and µ = UD.
Clearly, µ 2-dominates {λv}. Let f be a function such that ‖ f‖∞ = L and f (µ) ≤ 1. It follows
that
E
v←pi | f (µ)− f (λv)|
2 = E
ℓ,s∈[2]×{0,1}D
| f (Dℓ,s)− f (UD)|2
= E
ℓ,s∈[2]×{0,1}D
1
4
| f (Dℓ,s)− f (D1−ℓ,s)|2
= E
ℓ,s∈[2]×{0,1}D
fˆ (s)2. (Proposition 6.1)
By Lemma 3.8, it follows that
∑
s∈{0,1}D
fˆ (s)2 = E
x←UD
f (x)2 ≤ ‖ f‖∞ · f (UD) ≤ L.
Therefore, we can setW(L) :=
L
2D
. In this case, W is clearly concave. By Theorem 5.7, it follows
that
E
ℓ,s∈[2]×{0,1}D
[KL(R(Dℓ,s)||R(UD))] ≤ 2W(2eε) + 4(τ − 1)2 · δ ≤ 4e
ε
2D
+ 4δ.
Now we apply Lemma 6.4 to the ParityLearning problem. Recall that in ParityLearning, there is
a random hidden element s ∈ {0, 1}D , and each user gets a random element x together with the
inner product 〈s, x〉 over F2. Appending the label to the vector, each user indeed gets a random
sample from the set {x ∈ {0, 1}D+1 : 〈x, (s, 1)〉 = 0}, where (s, 1) is the (D+ 1)-dimensional vector
obtained by appending 1 to the end of the vector s. In otherwords, each user gets a random sample
from the distribution D0,(s,1).
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Lemma 6.5. For a public-coin randomizer R with public randomness from Dpub, if there is a family of
distributions {Dα}α∈supp(Dpub) overMk such that,
E
α←Dpub
dε
(
E
x←UD
Rα(x)||Dα
)
≤ o(1/n),
where n is the number of samples, then a public-coin protocol with randomizer R needs at least Ω
(
2D/eε
)
samples to solve ParityLearning with probability at least 0.99.
Proof. Suppose there is a public-coin protocol P with randomizer R solving ParityLearning with
probability at least 0.99. For a datasetW, we use P(W) (respectively, Pα(W)) to denote the output
of P onW (with public randomness fixed to α).
Consider running P on n uniformly random samples from {0, 1}D+1. We note that for at least
a 0.99 fraction of s ∈ {0, 1}D , we have that
E
α←Dpub
[
Pr[Pα(U⊗nD+1) = s]
]
= Pr[P(U⊗nD+1) = s] ≤ 0.01.
From the assumption that P solves ParityLearning, for all s ∈ {0, 1}D , we have
E
α←Dpub
[
Pr[Pα(D⊗n0,(s,1)) = s]
]
= Pr[P(D⊗n
0,(s,1)) = s] ≥ 0.99.
By a union bound, with probability at least 0.5 over α ← Dpub, we have
Pr[Pα(U⊗nD+1) = s] ≤ 0.1 and Pr[Pα(D⊗n0,(s,1)) = s] ≥ 0.9 for at least a 0.5 fraction of s ∈ {0, 1}D .
(6)
From our assumption and Markov’s inequality, with probability at least 0.99 over α ← Dpub, we
have that dε
(
E
x←UD
Rα(x)||Dα
)
≤ o(1/n). That is, Rα is (ε, o(1/n),UD)-dominated.
By a union bound, there exists an α ∈ supp(Dpub) such that Rα is (ε, o(1/D),UD)-dominated
and (6) is satisfied.
By Lemma 6.4, we have that
E
ℓ,s∈[2]×{0,1}D+1
[KL(Rα(Dℓ,s)||Rα(UD))] ≤ 4e
ε
2D+1
+ o(1/n),
which implies
E
s∈{0,1}D
[KL(Rα(D0,(s,1))||Rα(UD))] ≤ O
(
eε
2D
)
+ o(1/n).
Supposing n = o(2D/eε) for the sake of contradiction, it follows that
E
s∈{0,1}D
[KL(Rα(D0,(s,1))⊗n||Rα(UD+1)⊗n)] ≤ o(1).
Since there is at least a 0.5 fraction of s ∈ {0, 1}D satisfying the conditions in (6), it follows that
there exists an s ∈ {0, 1}D satisfying these conditions and KL(Rα(D0,(s,1))⊗n||Rα(UD+1)⊗n)] =
o(1), which, by Pinsker’s inequality, implies that
‖Rα(D0,(s,1))⊗n − Rα(UD+1)⊗n‖TV ≤ o(1),
and
Pr[Pα(D⊗n0,(s,1)) = s] ≤ Pr[Pα(U⊗nD+1) = s] + o(1) ≤ 0.01+ o(1),
a contradiction.
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We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.10.
Theorem 1.10. (restated) For any ε = O(1), if P is a public-coin (ε, o(1/n))-DPkshuffle protocol solving
ParityLearning with probability at least 0.99, then n ≥ Ω(2D/(k+1)).
Proof of Theorem 1.10. Applying Lemma 5.6 and letting τ = ε + k(1+ ln n), we have that
E
α←Dpub
dτ
(
E
x←UD
Rα(x)||Dα
)
≤ o(1/n),
for a distribution family {Dα}α∈supp(Dpub).
By Lemma 6.5, n ≥ Ω(2D/eτ) ≥ Ω(2D/(en)k). It then follows that nk+1 ≥ Ω(2D/ek) and
consequently n ≥ Ω(2D/(k+1)).
7 Lower Bound for CountDistinct with Maximum Hardness
In this section, we prove Theorem 1.1, which gives a Ω(n) lower bound on the error of DPlocal
protocols for CountDistinct.
7.1 Preliminaries
For (ℓ, s) ∈ [2]× {0, 1}D , recall that Dℓ,s is the uniform distribution on {x ∈ {0, 1}D : 〈x, s〉 = ℓ}.
As in Section 2.2, we also use Dαℓ,s to denote the mixture of Dℓ,s and UD which outputs a sample
from Dℓ,s with probability α and a sample from UD with probability 1− α. Note that Dαℓ,s can also
be interpreted as the mixture of Dℓ,s and D1−ℓ,s that outputs a sample from Dℓ,s with probability
1
2
+
α
2
, and a sample from D1−ℓ,s with probability 1
2
− α
2
. We next estimate the number of distinct
elements in n samples taken from Dαℓ,s.
Proposition 7.1. Set D = log n. For α ∈ (0, 0.01) and any (ℓ, s) ∈ [2]× {0, 1}D , let X be the number of
distinct elements in n samples drawn from Dαℓ,s. We have that
Pr
[∣∣∣X − (1− e−1 cosh(α)) · n∣∣∣ > 10√n] < 0.01.
Proof. In the following, we identify the index space [n] with {0, 1}log n in the natural way. For
i ∈ [n], we use Xi to denote the indicator of whether i occurs in the n samples taken from Dαℓ,s.
Note that these Xi’s are not independent, but they are negatively correlated [DR98, Proposition 7
and 11], and hence a Chernoff bound still applies.
Let i be an element in the support of Dℓ,s. Note that i equals one sample from Dαℓ,s with proba-
bility
2−D+1 ·
(
1
2
+
α
2
)
=
1+ α
n
.
Therefore, i occurs in n i.i.d. samples from Dαℓ,s with probability
p1 := 1− (1− (1+ α)/n)n = 1− eln(1−(1+α)/n)·n
= 1− e(−(1+α)/n+Θ((1+α)/n)2)·n
= 1− e−(1+α) · eΘ(1/n).
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Therefore, we have that ∣∣∣p1 − (1− e−(1+α))∣∣∣ ≤ O(1/n).
Similarly, for an element i in the support of Dℓ,s, i equals one sample from Dαℓ,s with probability
2−D+1 ·
(
1
2
− α
2
)
=
1− α
n
.
Hence, by a similar calculation, i occurs in n i.i.d. samples from Dαℓ,s with probability
p2 := 1− (1− (1− α)/n)n = 1− e−(1−α) · eΘ(1/n),
and ∣∣∣p2 − (1− e−(1−α))∣∣∣ ≤ O(1/n).
Hence, we have that
µ = E
[
∑
i∈[n]
Xi
]
= E
 ∑
i∈supp(Dℓ,s)
Xi
+ E
 ∑
i∈supp(Dℓ,s)
Xi

= (p1 + p2) · n
2
.
Let
ν = (1− e−1+α) · n/2+ (1− e−1−α) · n/2 = (1− e−1 cosh(α)) · n,
where the last equality holds since cosh(α) :=
eα + e−α
2
. Let X =
n
∑
i=1
Xi. Using the Chernoff bound
and the fact that |ν− µ| ≤ O(1), we have that
Pr
[∣∣∣X − (1− e−1 cosh(α)) · n∣∣∣ > 10√n] < 0.01,
which completes the proof.
7.2 DPlocal Lower bound
Lemma 7.2. For any ε > 0 and α ∈ [0, 1], if R is (ε, δ,UD)-dominated, then we have that
E
ℓ,j∈[2]×{0,1}D
[KL(Pαℓ,j||Q)] ≤ α2 ·
4eε
2D
+ 4δ.
Proof. We follow closely the proof of Lemma 6.4. To apply Theorem 5.7, we set the index set as
I = [2] × {0, 1}D , the distribution pi to be the uniform distribution over I , {λv}v∈I = {Dαv}v∈I ,
and µ = UD.
Clearly, µ 2-dominates {λv}. Let f be a function such that ‖ f‖∞ = L and f (µ) = 1. It follows
that
E
v←pi | f (µ)− f (λv)|
2 = E
(ℓ,s)∈[2]×{0,1}D
α2 · fˆ (s)2.
Recall that
E
(ℓ,s)∈[2]×{0,1}D
fˆ (s)2 ≤ L
2D
.
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Therefore, we can setW(L) := α2 · L
2D
. Clearly,W is a concave function. By Theorem 5.7, it follows
that
E
ℓ,j∈[2]×[D]
[KL(R(Dℓ,j)||R(UD))] ≤ 2W(2eε) + 4(τ − 1)2 · δ ≤ α2 · 4e
ε
2D
+ 4δ.
We now show that the CountDistinct function is hard for (ε, δ)-local algorithms.
Theorem 1.1. (restated) For ε ≤ 0.49 · ln n, if P is a public-coin (ε, o(1/n))-DPlocal protocol, then it
cannot compute CountDistinctn,n with error o(n/e
ε) and probability at least 0.99.
Proof. Let D = log n. We identify the input space [n] with {0, 1}D in the natural way. Suppose
there is a public-coin (ε, o(1/n))-DPlocal protocol P solving CountDistinctn,n with error o(n/e
ε) and
probability at least 0.99.
Let Rwith public randomness fromDpub be the randomizer used in P. For a datasetW, we use
P(W) (respectively, Pγ(W)) to denote the output of P on the datasetW (with public randomness
fixed to γ).
Setting α2 =
1
20eε
, we let µα = (1− e−1 cosh(α)) · n and µ0 = (1− e−1) · n.
By our assumption on P, Proposition 7.1 and a union bound, it follows that for every (ℓ, s) ∈
[2]× {0, 1}D , we have
E
γ←Dpub
[
Pr
[∣∣Pγ((Dαℓ,s)⊗n)− µα∣∣ ≤ n1000eε + 10√n]] ≥ 0.98.
Similarly, we have
E
γ←Dpub
[
Pr
[∣∣Pγ(U⊗nD )− µ0∣∣ ≤ n1000eε + 10√n]] ≥ 0.98.
Note that by our choice of ε, we have
n
1000eε
+ 10
√
n <
n
800eε
. By a union bound, it follows
that with probability at least 0.5 over γ ← Dpub, we have
Pr
[∣∣Pγ((Dαℓ,s)⊗n)− µα∣∣ < n800eε ] ≥ 0.8 and Pr [∣∣Pγ(U⊗nD )− µ0∣∣ < n800eε ] ≥ 0.8
for at least a 0.5 fraction of (ℓ, s) ∈ [2]× {0, 1}D . (7)
By the definition of public-coin DPlocal protocols, we have that with probability at least 0.99
over γ ← Dpub, Rγ is (ε, o(1/n),UD)-dominated. By a union bound, there exists a γ such that Rγ
is (ε, o(1/n),UD)-dominated and it satisfies the condition in (7). We fix such a γ.
By Lemma 7.2, it follows that
E
(ℓ,s)∈[2]×{0,1}D
[KL(Rγ(Dαℓ,s)||Rγ(UD))] ≤ α2 ·
2eε
2D
+ o(1/n).
Recall that α2 =
1
20eε
, the above further simplifies to
E
(ℓ,s)∈[2]×{0,1}D
[KL(Rγ(Dαℓ,s)||Rγ(UD))] ≤
1
10n
+ o(1/n).
40
Let S be the set of (ℓ, s) satisfying the conditions on (ℓ, s) stated in (7). Since S contains at aleast
a 0.5 fraction of [2]× {0, 1}D , it follows that
E
(ℓ,s)∈S
[KL(Rγ(Dαℓ,s)||Rγ(UD))] ≤
1
5n
+ o(1/n).
This means that there exists a pair (ℓ, s) ∈ S such that KL(Rγ(Dαℓ,s)||Rγ(UD)) ≤ 1/5n+ o(1/n).
We fix such a pair (ℓ, s).
We have KL(Rγ(Dαℓ,s)⊗n||Rγ(UD)⊗n) ≤ 1/5+ o(1). By Pinsker’s inequality, it follows that
‖Rγ(Dαℓ,s)⊗n − Rγ(UD)⊗n)‖TV ≤
√
1/2 · 1/5+ o(1) ≤ 0.4.
Since (ℓ, s) ∈ S, it follows that
Pr
[∣∣Pγ(U⊗nD )− µα∣∣ < n800eε ] ≥ Pr [∣∣Pγ((Dαℓ,s)⊗n)− µα∣∣ < n800eε ]− 0.4 ≥ 0.4. (8)
On the other hand, we also have
Pr
[∣∣Pγ(U⊗nD )− µ0∣∣ < n800eε ] ≥ 0.8. (9)
Note that |µα − µ0| = e−1(cosh(α)− 1) · n ≥ α2/2 · e−1 · n > n/200eε . Hence (8) and (9) give a
contradiction.
8 Low-Message DPshuffle Protocols for CountDistinct
In this section, we present our low-message DPshuffle protocols for CountDistinct, thereby proving
Theorem 1.6.
In Section 8.1, we review the previous protocol of [BCJM20], and discuss some intuitions un-
derlying our improvement. In Section 8.2, we introduce some necessary definitions and technical
tools. Next, in Section 8.3 we present our private-coin protocol (stated in Theorem 8.4) for Count-
Distinct with error O˜(
√
D), which uses 1/2+ o(1) message per user in expectation when the input
universe size is below n/polylog(n). Wewill also show that a simple modification of this protocol
is (ln(n) +O(1))-DPlocal, thereby proving Theorem 1.3. Finally, based on the private-coin proto-
col, in Section 8.4 we prove Theorem 1.6 by presenting our public-coin protocol for CountDistinct,
which uses less than 1 message per user in expectation without any restriction on the universe
size.
8.1 Intuition
We now turn to sketch the main ideas behind Theorem 8.4 and Theorem 1.6. It would be in-
structive to review the O˜(D)-message DPshuffle protocol solving CountDistinctn,D with errorO(
√
D)
from [BCJM20].
The DPmod2-shuffle Model. To gain more insights about their protocol, we consider the following
mod 2 shuffle model (DPmod2-shuffle), where two messages of the same content “cancel each other”,
i.e., the transcript is now a random permutation of messages that appear an odd number of times.
The DP requirement now applies to this new version of transcript. The same holds for the
analyzer, who now can only see the new version of transcript. [BCJM20] first gave a DPmod2-shuffle
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protocol for CountDistinct, and then adapted that protocol to the standard DPshuffle model using the
Ishai et al. protocol for secure aggregation [IKOS06].15
Low-Message Protocol inDPmod2-shuffle. The DPmod2-shuffle protocol of [BCJM20] (referred as Pmod2
in what follows) first sets a parameter q = Θ(1/n) so that Pr[Bin(n, q) ≡ 1 (mod 2)] = 1/(2eε/2).
Next, for each user holding an element x ∈ [D], the user first sends x with probability 1/2. Then
for each j ∈ [D], the user sends message j with probability q. All these events are independent.
Finally, if there are z messages in the transcript (i.e., there are z messages occurring an odd
number of times in the original transcript), then the analyzer outputs (2 · z · eε/2 − D)/(eε/2 − 1)
as the estimate. Note that a user sends 1/2+ D · q = 1/2+O(D/n)message in expectation.
Analysis of the Protocol Pmod2. It is shown in [BCJM20] that the above protocol is ε-DP and solves
CountDistinctn,D with errorO(
√
D). Here we briefly outline the intuition behind it.
Let S be the set consisting of all inputs of the users. We can see that every i ∈ S belongs to
the transcript with probability exactly 1/2; on the other hand, every i ∈ [D] \ S belongs to the
transcript with probability exactly Pr[Bin(n, q) ≡ 1 (mod 2)] = 1
2eε/2
. Moreover, all these events
are independent. Therefore, a simple calculation shows that (2E[z]eε/2 − D)/(eε/2 − 1) = |S|,
and the accuracy follows from a Chernoff bound. As for the DP guarantee, changing the input of
one user only affects the distributions of two messages in the transcript, and it only changes each
message’s occurrence probability in the transcript from 1/2 to 1/2eε/2 or vice versa.
From DPmod2-shuffle to DPshuffle. To obtain an actual DPshuffle protocol from Pmod2, the protocol
from [BCJM20] (which we henceforth denote by PBCJM) runs D copies of the protocol for securely
computing sum over F2 [IKOS06], such that the i-th protocol Pi aims to simulate the number of
occurrences of message imodulo 2. For each user i, if it were to send a message i in Pmod2, it sends
one in Pi; otherwise it sends zero in Pi.
Since the [IKOS06] protocol for computing sum over F2 requires O
(
log(1/δ)
log n
+ 1
)
messages
from each user [GMPV20, BBGN20], each user needs to send O
(
D ·
(
log(1/δ)
log n
+ 1
))
messages
in total. Moreover, from the security condition of Pi, for each message i the transcript only re-
veals the parity of its number of occurrences, which is exactly what we need in order to simulate
DPmod2-shuffle protocols.
Our Improvement. Note that PBCJM requires significantly more messages per user than that of
Pmod2. Our goal here is to compile Pmod2 to DPshuffle in a much more efficient way, ideally with no
overhead. In Pmod2 each user sends only 1/2+O(D/n) message. This means that when translat-
ing to PBCJM, users end up sending many zero messages in the Pi subprotocols, which is wasteful.
Our crucial idea for improving on the aforementioned protocol is a very simple yet effective
alternative to the secure aggregation protocol over F2 of [IKOS06] used in PBCJM. In our new
subprotocol Pi, if a user were to send a message i in Pmod2, it sends one to Pi; otherwise it draws
λ from a noise distribution D (such that E[D] ≈ polylog(δ−1)/n) and sends 2λ many ones to Pi.
Clearly, our new Pi still maintains the parity of occurrences of each messages, and the expected
number of messages is roughly 2 ·E[D] · D + 1/2 = O(polylog(δ−1)) · D/n+ 1/2. To show that
the resulting protocol is DPshuffle, we build on the techniques of [GKMP20], which show that the
noise added can hide the contribution of a single user.
15They did not explicit specify their protocol in the DPmod2-shuffle model, but it is implicit in their proof of security.
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8.2 Preliminaries
We first recall the definition of the negative binomial distribution.
Definition 8.1. Let r > 0 and p ∈ [0, 1], the negative binomial distribution NB(r, p) is defined by
Pr[NB(r, p) = k] =
(
k+ r− 1
k
)
(1− p)rpk for each non-negative integer k.16
We recall the following key properties of the negative binomial distribution: (1) For α, β > 0
and p ∈ [0, 1], NB(α, p) + NB(β, p) has the same distribution as NB(α + β, p); (2) E[NB(r, p)] =
pr
1− p .
We will need the following lemma from [GKMP20].
Lemma 8.2. For any ε > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1), and ∆ ∈ N, let p = e−0.1ε/∆ and r = 50 · eε/∆ · log(δ−1). For
any k ∈ {−∆,−∆ + 1, . . . ,∆− 1,∆}, dε(k+ NB(r, p)||NB(r, p)) ≤ δ.
The following is a simple corollary of Item (2) of Proposition 3.4 and Lemma 8.2.
Corollary 8.3. For any ε > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1), and ∆ ∈ N, let p and r be as in Lemma 8.2. For any two
distributions X and Y on {0, 1, 2, . . . ,∆}, dε(X +NB(r, p)||Y +NB(r, p)) ≤ δ.
8.3 A Private-Coin Base Protocol
Recall thatCountDistinctn,D denotes the restriction ofCountDistinct such that every user gets an input
from [D], and the goal is compute the number of distinct elements among all users.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 8.4, which is the private-coin case of Theorem 1.6. To
simplify the privacy analysis of the protocol and ease its application in Section 8.4, we also allow
the input to be 0, which means that the user’s input is not counted.
Theorem 8.4. For any ε ≤ O(1) and δ ≤ 1/n, there is a private-coin (ε, δ)-DPshuffle protocol computing
CountDistinctn,D with error O
(√
D · ε−1
)
with probability at least 0.99. Moreover, the expected number
of messages sent by each user is
1
2
+O
(
log(1/δ)2 ln(2/ε)
ε
· D
n
)
.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can assume that ε ≤ 1. The algorithm requires several global
constants that only depend on the values of n, ε, and δ. Algorithm 1 specifies these constants.
Here, c0 is a sufficiently large constant to be specified later.
Next, we specify the randomizer and the analyzer of the protocol in Algorithm 2 and Algo-
rithm 3 respectively.
Accuracy Analysis. We first analyze the error of our protocol. Let E be the set {xi}i∈[n],xi 6=0.
Recall that the goal is to estimate |E|.
For each i ∈ [D], we analyze the distribution of the random variable Ci in Algorithm 3. We
observe that: (1) if i ∈ E, then Ci is distributed uniformly at random over {0, 1}; (2) if i /∈ E, then
Ci is distributed as Ber
(
1
2eε0
)
by Lemma 8.5; (3) {Ci}i∈[D] are independent.
16For a real number α,
(
α
k
)
:=
k−1
∏
i=0
α− i
i+ 1
.
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Algorithm 1: Set-Global-Constants(n, ε, δ)
Input: n is the number of users and the pair (ε, δ) specifies the DP guarantee.
1 ε0 = min(ε/6, 0.01);
2 ∆ =
⌈
c0 · log δ−1 ln(ε−10 ) + 1
⌉
;
3 p = e−0.1ε0/∆;
4 r = 50 · eε0/∆ · log(10δ−1);
5 q =
1− (1− e−ε0)1/n
2
;
Algorithm 2: Randomizer(x, D, n, ε, δ)
Input: x ∈ {0} ∪ [D] is the user’s input. D is the universe size.
1 Set-Global-Constants(n, ε, δ);
2 Toss a uniformly random coin to get v ∈ {0, 1};
3 if v = 1 and x 6= 0 then
4 send message (x);
5 for i ∈ [D] do
6 Let y ← Ber(q′);
7 if y = 1 then
8 send message (i);
9 Let η ← NB(r/n, p);
10 Send 2 · η messages (i);
Algorithm 3: Analyzer(S, D, n, ε, δ)
Input: S is the multi-set of messages. D is the universe size.
1 Set-Global-Constants(n, ε, δ);
2 for i ∈ [D] do
3 Let yi be the number of message (i) in S;
4 Ci = yi mod 2;
5 C =
D
∑
i=1
Ci;
6 z =
2Ceε0 − D
eε0 − 1 ;
7 return z;
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Lemma 8.5 ([BCJM20, Lemma 3.5]). Let n, q′ be specified as in Global-Constants(n, ε, δ). Then, [Bin(n, q′)
mod 2] is distributed identically to Ber
(
1
2eε0
)
.
Hence, we have that E[C] = |E| · 1
2
+ (D − |E|) · 1
2eε0
. Plugging in the equation defining the
output z, we have E[z] = E
[
2Ceε0 − D
eε0 − 1
]
= |E|. An application of Hoeffding’s inequality implies
that
Pr
[
|z− |E|| > c · (ε0)−1 ·
√
D
]
< 0.01,
for a sufficiently large constant c. Hence, with probability at least 0.99, the error of the protocol is
less than c · (ε0)−1 ·
√
D = O(
√
D · ε−1).
Privacy Analysis. We now prove that our protocol is indeed (ε, δ)-DP. Note that the multi-set
of messages S can be described by integers (yi)i∈[D] (corresponding to the histogram of the mes-
sages).
Consider two neighboring datasets x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) and x
′ = (x′1, x2, . . . , xn) (without loss
of generality, we assume that they differ at the first user). Let Y and Y′ be the corresponding
distributions of (yi)i∈[D] given input datasets x and x′. The goal is to show that they satisfy the
(ε, δ)-DP constraint. That is, we have to establish that dε(Y||Y′) ≤ δ.
To simplify the analysis, we introduce another dataset x¯ = (0, x2, . . . , xn), and let Y¯ be the
corresponding distribution of (yi)i∈[D] given input dataset x¯. By the composition rule of (ε, δ)-
DP, it suffices to show that the pairs (Y, Y¯) and (Y¯,Y′) satisfy (ε/2, δ/3)-DP (note that ε < 1,
and δ/3 + eε/2 · δ/3 ≤ δ). By symmetry, it suffices to consider the pair (Y, Y¯) and prove that
dε/2(Y||Y¯) ≤ δ/3.
Let i = x1, and mi be the number of times that i appears in x2, . . . , xn. First note that all
coordinates in both Y and Y¯ are independent, and furthermore the marginal distribution of Y and
Y¯ on coordinates in [D] \ {i} are identical. Hence, by Item (1) of Proposition 3.4, it suffices to
establish that Yi and Y¯i satisfy (ε/2, δ/3)-DP.
The distribution of Y¯i is Bin(n, q
′) + 2 · NB(r, p) + Bin(mi, 1/2), and the distribution of Yi is
Bin(n, q′) + 2 · NB(r, p) + Bin(mi + 1, 1/2).17 Since Bin(mi + 1, 1/2) = Bin(mi, 1/2) + Ber(1/2), it
suffices to consider the case where mi = 0 by Item (1) of Proposition 3.4.
We need the following lemma, whose proof is deferred until we finish the proof of Theorem 8.4.
Lemma 8.6. Let n, q′,λ be specified as in Set-Global-Constants(n, ε, δ), X = Bin(n, q′) + 2 · NB(r, p),
and Y = Bin(n, q′) + 2 ·NB(r, p) + Ber(1/2). Then,
dε/2(X||Y) ≤ δ/3 and dε/2(Y||X) ≤ δ/3.
By Lemma 8.6 and previous discussions, it follows that Dε(Y||Y′) ≤ δ, which shows that our
protocol is (ε, δ)-DP as desired.
In the following, we will need the proposition below which gives us an estimate on q′.
Proposition 8.7. Let n, q′, ε0 be specified as in Set-Global-Constants(n, ε, δ). Then, q′ ≤ O(ln(ε−10 )/n).
17 Recall that for two random variables X and Y, we use X + Y to denote the random variable distributed as a sum
of two independent samples from X and Y.
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Proof. Since ε0 ≤ 0.01, we have e−ε0 ≤ 1− ε0/2. Hence, 1− e−ε0 ≥ ε0/2. Plugging in the definition
of q′, it follows that (1− e−ε0)1/n ≥ eln(ε0/2)/n ≥ 1+ ln(ε0/2)/n. Finally, it follows that
q′ =
1− (1− e−ε0)1/n
2
≤ − ln(ε0/2)/2n = O(ln(ε−10 )/n).
Efficiency Analysis. We now analyze the message complexity of our protocol. Note that
E[NB(r/n, p)] =
1
n
· pr
1− p = O
(
1
n
· ∆
ε0
· log(1/δ)
)
= O
(
1
n
· ε−1 ln(2/ε) · log(1/δ)2
)
.
By a straightforward calculation, each user sends
1
2
+O(D ·E[NB(r/n, p)] + D · q′) ≤ 1
2
+O
(
log(1/δ)2 ln(2/ε)
ε
· D
n
)
messages in expectation.
Finally, we prove Lemma 8.6.
Proof of Lemma 8.6. We consider bounding Dε/2(X||Y) first. Note that since q′ = O(ln(ε−10 )/n) by
Proposition 8.7, we set the constant c0 so that
Pr
[
Bin(n, q′) > c0 · log δ−1 ln(ε−1)
]
≤ δ/10.
Recall that ∆ = ⌈c0 · log δ−1 ln(ε−1) + 1⌉, and note that our choices of r and p satisfy Lemma 8.2
with privacy parameters ε0 ≤ ε/6 and δ/10.
Now, let A = Bin(n, q′), N = NB(r, p), and B = Ber(1/2).
To apply Item (2) of Proposition 3.4, we are going to decompose X = A + 2 · N and Y =
A+ 2 · N + B into a weighted sum of three sub-distributions.
Decomposition of X = A+ 2 · N. We define three events on A as follows:
Ebig = [A > c0 · log(δ−1)], Eeven = [A ≤ c0 · log(δ−1) ∧ A ≡ 0 mod 2],
and
Eodd = [A ≤ c0 · log(δ−1) ∧ A ≡ 1 mod 2].
We let αbig = Pr
A
[Ebig], αeven = Pr
A
[Eeven], αodd = Pr
A
[Eeven].
From our choice of c0, we have αbig = Pr
[
Bin(n, q′) > c0 · log δ−1 ln(ε−1)
]
≤ δ/10. Let q =
1
2eε0
. By Lemma 8.5, it follows that |αodd − q| ≤ δ/10 and |αeven − (1− q)| ≤ δ/10.
Therefore, let Abig := A|Ebig, Aeven := A|Eeven and Aodd := A|Eodd. We can now decompose
A + 2N as a mixture of components Abig + 2N, Aeven + 2N and Aodd + 2N with corresponding
mixing weights αbig, αeven and αodd.
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Decomposition of Y = A+ 2 · N + B. Now, we define three events on (A, B) as follows
E˜big = [A > c0 · log(δ−1)], E˜even = [A ≤ c0 · log(δ−1) ∧ A+ B ≡ 0 mod 2],
and
E˜odd = [A ≤ c0 · log(δ−1) ∧ A+ B ≡ 1 mod 2].
Similarly, we let βbig = Pr
A,B
[E˜big], βeven = Pr
A,B
[E˜even], βodd = Pr
A,B
[E˜even].
By our choice of c0, we have βbig ≤ δ/10. Since Pr[A + B ≡ 1 mod 2] = 1/2, it follows that
|βeven − 1/2| ≤ δ/10 and |βodd − 1/2| ≤ δ/10.
Let (A+ B)big := (A+ B)|E˜big, (A+ B)even := (A+ B)|E˜even and (A+ B)odd := (A+ B)|E˜odd.
We therefore decompose A+ 2N + B as a mixture of components (A+ B)big + 2N, (A+ B)even +
2N and (A+ B)odd + 2N with mixing weights βbig, βeven and βodd.
Bounding dε/2(X||Y). By Item (2) of Proposition 3.4, we have that
dε/2(X||Y) ≤αbig
+αeven · dε/2+ln(βeven/αeven)(Aeven + 2N||(A + B)even + 2N)
+αodd · dε/2+ln(βodd/αodd)(Aodd + 2N||(A + B)odd + 2N).
Now, note that
βodd
αodd
≥ 1, and βeven
αeven
≥ 1/2− δ/10
1− q+ δ/10 ≥ e
−2ε0 . It follows that ε/2+ ln(βeven/αeven) ≥
ε/2− 2ε0 ≥ ε0 (since ε0 ≤ ε/6), and ε/2+ ln(βodd/αodd) ≥ ε/2 ≥ ε0.
Hence by Corollary 8.3, we have that
dε/2(X||Y) ≤ δ/10+ dε0 (Aodd+ 2N||(A+ B)odd + 2N)+ dε0 (Aeven+ 2N||(A+ B)even + 2N) ≤ δ/3.
By a similar calculation, we can also bound dε(Y||X) by δ/3.
Extension to Robust Shuffle Privacy. Now we briefly discuss how to generalize the analysis
of the above protocol in order to show that it also satisfies the stronger robust shuffle privacy
condition. We first need the following formal definition of robust shuffle privacy.
Definition 8.8 ([BCJM20]). A protocol P = (R, S, A) is (ε, δ,γ)-robustly shuffle differential private
if, for all n ∈ N and γ′ ≥ γ, the algorithm Sγ′n ◦ Rγ′n is (ε, δ)-DP. In other words, P guarantees
(ε, δ)-shuffle privacy whenever at least a γ fraction of users follow the protocol.
Note that while the above definition requires the privacy condition to be satisfied whenever
there is at least a γ fraction of users participating, the accuracy condition is only required when all
users participate. That is, if some users drop from the protocol, then the analyzer does not need to
output an accurate estimate of CountDistinct.
Theorem 8.9. For two constants γ, ε ∈ (0, 1], and δ ≤ 1/n, there is an (ε, δ,γ)-robustly shuffle differ-
entially private protocol solving CountDistinctn,D with error Oγ,ε
(√
D
)
and with probability at least 0.99.
Moreover, the expected number of messages sent by each user is
1
2
+Oγ,ε
(
log(1/δ)2 · D
n
)
.18
18To make the notation clean, we choose not to analyze the exact dependence on ε and γ.
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Proof Sketch. Tomake the algorithm in Theorem 8.4 robustly shuffle private, we need the following
modifications:
• In Algorithm 1, we set q′ =
1− (1− e−ε0)1/(γn)
2
, instead of q′ =
1− (1− e−ε0)1/n
2
.
• In Algorithm 2, we let η ← NB(r/(γn), p), instead of η ← NB(r/n, p).
• In Algorithm 3, we set z =
2Cτ − D
τ − 1 for τ =
1
1− (1− eε0)1/γ , instead of z =
2Ceε0 − D
eε0 − 1 .
The first two modifications guarantee that there is enough noise even when only γ · n users
participate, so that the privacy analysis of Theorem 8.4 goes through. We now show that the last
modification allows us to obtain an accurate estimate of CountDistinctn,D when all users participate.
In the following, we will use the same notation as in the proof of Theorem 8.4. Note that we have
q′ =
1− (1− e−ε0)1/(γn)
2
=
1− (1− τ−1)1/n
2
.
Hence by Lemma 8.5, Ci is distributed as Ber(1/2τ) when i /∈ E. A similar calculation then shows
that the error can be bounded by Oτ(
√
D) = Oε,γ(
√
D).
ln(O(n))-DPlocal Protocol for CountDistinct. Finally, we show that the protocol from Theorem 8.4
is also ln(O(n))-DPlocal with a simple modification, which proves Theorem 1.3 (restated below).
Theorem 1.3. (restated) There is a (ln(n) +O(1))-DPlocal protocol computing CountDistinctn,n with
error O(
√
n).
Proof Sketch. Let D = n. We consider the following modification of Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 4: Randomizer(x, D, n, ε, δ)
Input: x ∈ [D] is the user’s input. D is the universe size.
1 ε0 = 1, q
′ =
1− (1− e−ε0)1/n
2
;
2 Toss a uniformly random coin to get v ∈ {0, 1};
3 if v = 1 then
4 send message (x);
5 for i ∈ [D] \ {x} do
6 Let y ← Ber(q′);
7 if y = 1 then
8 send message (i);
That is, in Algorithm 4 we remove the noise messages sampled from the distribution 2 ·
NB(r/n, p). Also, we do not send the same message more than once (the loop over i skips the
element x).
When viewing it as a local protocol, we can assume that each user first collects all the messages
it would send in Algorithm 4, and then simply outputs the histogram (so our new local random-
izer only sends a single message). The analyzer in the local protocol can then aggregate these
histograms, and apply the analyzer in Algorithm 3. By the same accuracy proof as in Theorem 8.4,
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it follows that the protocol achieves error O(
√
n) with probability at least 0.99. So it only remains
to prove that the protocol is ln(O(n))-DPlocal.
We let R be the randomizer in Algorithm 4, and we use Hist(R(x)) to denote the distribution
of the histogram of the messages output by R, which is exactly the output distribution of our new
local randomizer.
Without loss of generality, it suffices to show that for all possible histograms z ∈ {0, 1}D (note
that Algorithm 4 does not send a message more than once), it holds that
Hist(R(1))z
Hist(R(2))z
≤ O(n).
Note that
Hist(R(1))z
Hist(R(2))z
only depends on the first two bits of z. By enumerating all possible combi-
nation of two bits, we can bound it by
Hist(R(1))z
Hist(R(2))z
≤ 1/2
q′
· 1− q
′
1/2
=
1− q′
q′
≤ O(n).
The last inequality follows from the fact that q′ = Θ(1/n).
8.4 Public-Coin Protocol
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.6 (restated below).
Theorem 1.6. (restated) For all ε ≤ O(1) and δ ≤ 1/n, there is a public-coin (ε, δ)-DPshuffle protocol
computing CountDistinctn with error O
(√
n · log(δ−1) · ε−1.5 ·
√
ln(2/ε)
)
and probability at least 0.99.
Moreover, the expected number of messages sent by each user is at most 1.
Proof. Let c1 be the constant in Theorem 8.4 such that the expected number ofmessages is bounded
by c1 · log(1/δ)
2 ln(2/ε)
ε
· D
n
+ 1/2.
The Protocol. We set D =
⌊
n
/(
2 · c1 · log(1/δ)
2 ln(2/ε)
ε
)⌋
so that the foregoing expected
number of messages is bounded by 1.
Note that we can assume ε−1 · ln(2/ε) · log(1/δ)2 = o(n) as otherwise we are only required
to solve CountDistinctn with the trivial error bound O(n). Therefore, we have D ≥ 1 and n/D =
O(ε−1 · ln(2/ε) · log(1/δ)2).
We are going to apply a reduction to the private-coin protocol for CountDistinctn,D in Theo-
rem 8.4. The full protocol is as follows:
• Using the public randomness, the users jointly sample a uniformly randommapping f : X →
[n] and a uniformly random permutation pi on [n].
• For each user holding an input x ∈ X , it computes z = pi( f (x)), and sets its new input to be
z if z ≤ D, and 0 otherwise. Then it runs the private-coin protocol in Theorem 8.4.
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• Let fn(m) := n ·
(
1−
(
1− 1
n
)m)
. The analyzer first runs the analyzer in Theorem 8.4 to
obtain an estimate z¯. Then it computes zˆ = z¯ · n
D
, and outputs
z = argmin
m∈{0,1,...,n}
| fn(m)− zˆ|.
Analysis of the Protocol. The privacy of the protocol above follows directly from the privacy
property of the protocol from Theorem 8.4. Moreover, the bound on the expected number of
messages per user simply follows from our choice of the parameter D.
It thus suffices to establish the accuracy guarantee of the protocol. Let S = {xi}i∈[n] be the set
of all inputs, and the goal is to estimate |S|. We also let Sˆ = { f (xi)}i∈[n] and S¯ = Sˆ ∩ pi−1([D]).
By the accuracy guarantee of Theorem 8.4, it follows that with probability at least 0.99, we have
|z¯− |S¯|| ≤ O(
√
D · ε−1).
In the following, we will condition on this event.
Proving that zˆ is a good estimate of |Sˆ|. Next, we show that zˆ is close to |Sˆ|. We will rely on the
following lemma.
Lemma 8.10. For a uniformly random permutation pi : [n] → [n] and a fixed set E, for every B ∈ [1, n]
such that n/B is an integer, let Epi,n/B = E ∩ pi−1([n/B]), we have
Pr
pi
[∣∣∣|Epi,n/B| · B− |E|∣∣∣ ≥ 10 ·√B · |E|] ≤ 0.01.
Proof. For each i ∈ [n], let Xi = Xi(pi) be the indicator that i ∈ Epi,n/B. Note that these Xi’s are not
independent, but they are negatively correlated [DR98, Proposition 7 and 11], hence a Chernoff
bound still applies.
Note that E[Xi] =
1
B
· |E|
n
. By a Chernoff bound, it thus follows that
Pr
pi
[∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
Xi − n ·E[X1]
∣∣∣ ≥ 10 ·√n ·E[Xi]
]
≤ 0.01,
and hence
Pr
pi
[∣∣∣|Epi,n/B| − |E|/B∣∣∣ ≥ 10 ·√|E|/B] ≤ 0.01.
Scaling both sides of the above inequality by B concludes the proof.
We now set B =
n
D
and recall that zˆ = B · z¯. By Lemma 8.10, with probability at least 0.98, it
holds that
|zˆ− |Sˆ|| ≤ ∣∣zˆ− |S¯| · B∣∣+ ∣∣|Sˆ| − |S¯| · B∣∣
≤ B · |z¯− |S¯||+O(
√
B · n)
= O(B
√
D · ε−1) +O(
√
B · n) = O(
√
Bn · ε−1).
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Proving that z is a good estimate of |S|. Finally, we show that our output z is a good estimate of
|S|. To do so, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 8.11. Let fn(m) := n ·
(
1−
(
1− 1
n
)m)
. For a uniformly random mapping f : X → [n] and a
fixed set E ⊆ X such that |E| = m ≤ n, we have that
Pr[||{ f (x)}x∈E | − fn(m)| ≥ 10
√
n] ≤ 0.01.
Proof. For each i ∈ [n], let Xi = Xi( f ) be the indicator whether i ∈ { f (x)}x∈E. As before, these Xi’s
are not independent but are negatively correlated [DR98, Proposition 7 and 11], hence a Chernoff
bound still applies.
Note that E[Xi] =
(
1−
(
1− 1
n
)m)
. By a Chernoff bound, it thus follows that
Pr
pi
[∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
Xi − n ·E[X1]
∣∣∣ ≥ 10 ·√n ·E[Xi]
]
≤ 0.01.
Noting that
n
∑
i=1
Xi = |{ f (x)}x∈E| and n ·E[Xi] = fn(m) completes the proof.
By Lemma 8.11, it follows that with probability at least 0.99, we have
∣∣|Sˆ| − fn(|S|)∣∣ ≤ 10√n.
Putting everything together, with probability at least 0.97, we get that
|zˆ− fn(|S|)| ≤ O(
√
Bn · ε−1).
The final step is to show that z accurately estimates |S|. Recall that z = argmin
m∈{0,1,...,n}
| fn(m)− zˆ|,
which in particular means that
| fn(z)− zˆ| ≤ | fn(|S|)− zˆ| ≤ O(
√
Bn · ε−1).
By a triangle inequality, it follows that
| fn(z)− fn(|S|)| ≤ O(
√
Bn · ε−1).
We need the following lemma to finish the analysis.
Lemma 8.12. There is a constant c > 0 such that for all a, b ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, it holds that
| fn(a)− fn(b)| ≥ c · |a− b|.
Proof. Suppose a < b without loss of generality. Let t = b− a. We have that
fn(b)− fn(a) = n ·
((
1− 1
n
)a
−
(
1− 1
n
)b)
= n ·
(
1− 1
n
)a
·
(
1−
(
1− 1
n
)t)
= Ω
(
n · t
n
)
= Ω(t).
Finally, by Lemma 8.12, with probability at least 0.97 > 0.9, we obtain that |z− |S|| ≤ O(
√
Bn ·
ε−1), which concludes the proof.
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9 Lower Bounds in Two-Party Differential Privacy
In this section, we depart from the local and shuffle models, and instead consider the two-party
differential privacy [MMP+10], which can be defined as follows.
Definition 9.1 (DP in the Two-Party Model [MMP+10]). There are two parties A and B; A holds
X = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n and B holds Y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ X n. Let P be any randomized protocol be-
tween A and B. Let VIEWAP (X,Y) denote the tuple (X, the private randomness of A, the transcript
of the protocol). Similarly, let VIEWBP(X,Y) denote the tuple (Y, the private randomness of B, the
transcript of the protocol).
We say that P is (ε, δ)-DPtwo-party if, for any X,Y ∈ X n, the algorithms
(y1, . . . , yn) 7→ VIEWAP (X, (y1, . . . , yn))
(x1, . . . , xn) 7→ VIEWBP((x1, . . . , xn),Y)
are both (ε, δ)-DP.
We say that a two-party protocol P computes a function f : X 2n → R with error β if, at the end
of the protocol, at least one of the parties can output a number that lies in f (x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn)±
β with probability at least 0.9.
We quickly note that, unlike in the local and shuffle models, we need not consider the public-
coin and private-coin cases separately: as noted in [MMP+10], the two parties may share fresh
private random bits without violating privacy, meaning that public randomness is unnecessary.
The goal of this section is to prove Theorem 1.11. To do this, we first state the necessary lower
bound from [MMP+10] in Section 9.1. We then give our reduction and prove Theorem 1.11 in
Section 9.2. Finally, in Section 9.3, we extend the lower bound to the case where the function is
symmetric.
9.1 Inner Product Lower Bound from [MMP+10]
McGregor et al. [MMP+10] show that the inner product function is hard in the two-party model.
Roughly speaking, they show that, if we let X,Y be uniformly random strings, then, for any not-
too-large m ∈ N, no (O(1), o(1/n))-DPtwo-party protocol can distinguish between 〈X,Y〉 mod m
and a uniformly random number from {0, . . . ,m− 1}. McGregor et al. use this result when m =
Ω˜ε(
√
n), but we will use their result for m = 2.
To avoid confusion in the next subsection, we will use D in place of n in this subsection. The
following theorem is implicit in the proof of Theorem A.5 of [MMP+11] (it follows by replacing
m = 6∆/δ with m = 2 there). Recall that UD is the uniform distribution over {0, 1}D .
Theorem 9.2 ([MMP+11]). Let P be any (ε, δ)-DPtwo-party protocol. Suppose (X,Y) ← U⊗2D and let Z
be a uniformly random bit. Then, we have
‖(VIEWBP(X,Y), 〈X,Y〉 mod 2)− (VIEWBP(X,Y),Z)‖TV ≤ O (Dδ) + e−Ωε(D).
It will be more convenient to state the above lower bound in terms of hardness of distinguish-
ing two distributions, as we have done in the rest of this paper. To state this, we will need the
following few notation. First, we use D0 to denote the distribution U⊗2D conditioned on the in-
ner product of the two strings being 0 mod 2; similarly, we use D1 to denote the distribution U⊗2D
conditioned on the inner product of the two strings being 1 mod 2. Furthermore, for any distribu-
tion D on ({0, 1}D)2, we write VIEWAP (D) (respectively, VIEWBP(D)) to denote the distribution of
VIEWAP (X,Y) (respectively, VIEW
B
P(X,Y)) when X,Y are drawn according to D.
Wemay now state the following corollary, which is an immediate consequence of Theorem 9.2.
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Corollary 9.3. Let P be any (ε, δ)-DPtwo-party protocol. Then, we have that
‖VIEWBP(D0)− VIEWBP(D1)‖TV ≤ O (Dδ) + e−Ωε(D).
9.2 From Parity to the Ω˜(n) Gap
We will now construct the hard distributions that eventually give the gap of Ω˜(n) between the
sensitivity and the error achievable in two-party model. The hard distributions are simply con-
catenations of D0 or D1. Specifically, tor T ∈ N, we write D0,T (respectively, D1,T) to denote the
distribution of ((x1, . . . , xDT), (y1, . . . , yDT)) where ((x(i−1)D+1, . . . , xiD), (y(i−1)D+1, . . . , yiD)) is an
i.i.d. sample from D0 (respectively, D1,T) for all i ∈ [T]. Similar to before, it is hard to distinguish
the two distributions:
Lemma 9.4. Let P be any (ε, δ)-DPtwo-party protocol. Then, we have
‖VIEWBP(D0,T)− VIEWBP(D1,T)‖TV ≤ O (TDδ) + T · e−Ωε(D).
Proof. Weprove this via a simple hybrid argument. For j ∈ [T+ 1], let us denote byDj the distribu-
tion of ((x1, . . . , xDT), (y1, . . . , yDT))where, for all i ∈ [T], ((x(i−1)D+1, . . . , xiD), (y(i−1)D+1, . . . , yiD))
is independent from D1 if i < j and from D0 otherwise. Notice that D1 = D0,T and DT+1 = D1,T.
Our main claim is the following. For every j ∈ [T] and any (ε, δ)-DPtwo-party protocol P,
‖VIEWBP(Dj)− VIEWBP(Dj+1)‖TV ≤ O (Dδ) + e−Ωε(D). (10)
Note that summing (10) over all j ∈ [T] immediately yields Lemma 9.4.
We will now prove (10). Given an (ε, δ)-DPtwo-party protocol P (where each party’s input has
DT bits), we construct a protocol P′ (where each party’s input has D bits) as follows:
• Suppose that the input of A is x′1, . . . , x
′
D, and the input of B is y
′
1, . . . , y
′
D.
• For i = 1, . . . , j− 1, A samples ((x(i−1)D+1, . . . , xiD), (y(i−1)D+1, . . . , yiD)) from D1 and sends
(y(i−1)D+1, . . . , yiD) to B.
• i = j + 1, . . . , T, A samples ((x(i−1)D+1, . . . , xiD), (y(i−1)D+1, . . . , yiD)) from D0 and sends
(y(i−1)D+1, . . . , yiD) to B.
• A sets (x(j−1)D+1, . . . , xjD) = (x′1, . . . , x
′
D).
• B sets (y(j−1)D+1, . . . , yjD) = (y′1, . . . , y
′
D).
• A and B then run the protocol P on ((x1, . . . , xDT), (y1, . . . , yDT)).
It is clear that P′ is (ε, δ)-DPtwo-party and that
‖VIEWBP′(D0,T)− VIEWBP′(D1,T)‖TV ≥ ‖VIEWBP(Dj)− VIEWBP(Dj+1)‖TV .
Inequality (10) then follows from Corollary 9.3.
We can now prove our main theorem of this section.
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Proof of Theorem 1.11. Let C > 0 be a sufficiently large constant to be chosen later. Let D =
⌈C log n⌉ and T = ⌊n/D⌋. We may define f on only 2DT bits, as it can be trivially extended
to 2n bits by ignoring the last n− DT bits of X,Y. Let
f (x1, . . . , xDT, y1, . . . , yDT) = ∑
i∈[T]
(
∑
ℓ∈[D]
x(i−1)D+jy(i−1)D+j mod 2
)
,
where the outer summation is over Z.
It is immediate that the sensitivity of f is one. We will now argue that any (ε, δ)-DPtwo-party
protocol P with δ = o(1/n) incurs error at least Ω(n/ log n). Since the function is symmetric with
respect to the two parties, it suffices without loss of generality to show that the output of B incurs
error Ω(n/ log n) with probability 0.1. To do so, we start by observing that we have f (X,Y) = 0
for any (X,Y) ∈ supp(D0,T) whereas f (X,Y) = T for any (X,Y) ∈ supp(D1,T). From Lemma 9.4,
we have that
‖VIEWBP(D0,T)− VIEWBP(D1,T)‖TV ≤ O (TDδ) + T · e−Ωε(D).
As a result, if we sample (X,Y) fromD0,T with probability 1/2 andD1,T with probability 1/2, then
the probability that B’s output incurs error at least T/2 is at least
1
2
−O (TDδ)− T · e−Ωε(D) ≥ 1
2
− o(1)− n · e−Ωε(C log n).
When C is sufficiently large, we also have that n · e−Ωε(C log n) = o(1). As a result, with probability
1/2− o(1) (which is at least 0.1 for any sufficiently large n), the protocol P must incur an error of
at least T/2 = Ω(n/ log n).
9.3 Symmetrization
Notice that the function in Theorem 1.11 is asymmetric. It is a natural question to ask whether
we can get a similar lower bound for a symmetric function. In this subsection, we give a simple
reduction that positively answers this question, ultimately yielding the following:
Theorem 9.5. For any ε = O(1) and any sufficiently large n ∈ N, there is a symmetric function f :
[2n]2n → R whose sensitivity is one and such that any (ε, o(1/n))-DPtwo-party protocol cannot compute f
to within an error of o(n/ log n).
We remark that the input to each user comes from a setX of size Ω(n), instead ofX = {0, 1} as
in Theorem 1.11. This larger value of |X | turns out to be necessary for symmetric functions: when
f is symmetric, we may use the Laplace mechanism from both sides to estimate the histogram of
the input, which we can then use to compute f . If the sensitivity of f isO(1), this algorithm incurs
an error of Oε(|X |). Hence, to achieve a lower bound of Ω˜(n), we need |X | to be at least Ω˜ε(n).
The properties of our reduction are summarized in the following lemma, which combinedwith
Theorem 1.11, immediately implies Theorem 9.5.
Lemma 9.6. For any function g : X 2n → R, there is another function f : (X × [n])2n → R such that the
following holds:
• The sensitivity of f is no more than that of g.
• If there exists an (ε, δ)-DPtwo-party protocol that solves f with error β, then there exists an (ε, δ)-
DPtwo-party protocol that solves f with error 2β.
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The idea behind the proof of Lemma 9.6 is simple. Roughly speaking, we view each input
(x, i) ∈ X × [n] of f as “setting the ith position to x” for the input to g. This is formalized below.
Proof of Lemma 9.6. We start by defining f . Let u∗ be an arbitrary element of X . For every i ∈ [n],
we define hi : (X × [n])n where
hi((w1, . . . ,wn)) =
{
the unique x such that ∃j ∈ [n],wj = (x, i) if |{x ∈ X | ∃j ∈ [n],wj = (x, i)}| = 1,
u∗ otherwise.
We now define f by
f (W,V) =
1
2
· g(h1(W), . . . , hn(W), h1(V), · · · , hn(V)).
We will next verify that the two properties hold.
• Notice that changing any user’s input in f results in at most two changes in the user’s input
of g. As a result, the sensitivity of f is no more than that of g.
• Suppose that there exists an (ε, δ)-DPtwo-party protocol P that solves f with error β. Let P
′ be
the protocol for gwhere A, B transform their inputs (x1, . . . , xn), (y1, . . . , yn) to ((x1, 1), . . . , (xn, n)),
((y1, 1), . . . , (yn, n)) respectively, then run P, and finally return the output of Pmultiplied by
two. It is obvious that P′ is (ε, δ)-DPtwo-party; furthermore, since the protocol P incurs error
β, the protocol P′ incurs error 2β as desired.
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A Total Variance Bound betweenMixtures of Multi-dimensional Pois-
son Distributions
In this section we prove Lemma 4.3 (restated below).
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Lemma 4.3. (restated) Let U,V be two random variables supported on [0,Λ] such that E[U j] = E[V j]
for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L}, where L ≥ 1. Let D ∈ N and ~θ,~λ ∈ (R≥0)D such that ‖~θ‖1 = 1. Let D~θ be the
distribution over [D] corresponding to~θ. Suppose that
Pr
i←D~θ
[~λi ≥ 2Λ2 ·~θi] ≥ 1− 1
2Λ
.
Then,
‖E[ ~Poi(U~θ +~λ)]−E[ ~Poi(V~θ +~λ)]‖2TV ≤
1
L!
.
To prove Lemma 4.3, we begin with some notation. Let D ∈ N. For vectors ~m ∈ ND and
~λ ∈ RD, we let
~m! :=
D
∏
i=1
mi! and ~λ
~m :=
D
∏
i=1
(~λi)
~mi .
We are going to apply the moment-matching technique [WY16, JHW18, WY19] for bound-
ing total variance between mixtures of (single-dimensional) Poisson distributions. The following
lemma is a direct generalization of the Theorem 4 of [Yan19] to mixtures of multi-dimensional
Poisson distributions. We will use the convention that 00 = 1.
Lemma A.1. For~λ ∈ RD and two distributions ~U and ~V supported on
D
∏
i=1
[−λi,∞], we have that
‖E[ ~Poi(~U +~λ)]−E[ ~Poi(~V +~λ)]‖2TV ≤ ∑
~m∈(Z≥0)D
(
E[~U~m]−E[~V~m]
)2
~m! ·~λ~m .
In order to prove the above lemma, we need to use the Charlier polynomial cm(x;λ). The
explicit definition of cm(x;λ) is not important here; we simply list two important properties of
this polynomial family [PT11]:
Proposition A.2. Let λ ∈ R and u ∈ [−λ,∞], the following hold:
1. We have that
E
X←Poi(λ)
[cm(X;λ)cn(X;λ)] =
n!
λn
· 1[m = n].
2. For all z ∈ Z≥0,
Poi(λ + u)z
Poi(λ)z
= e−u ·
(
1+
u
λ
)z
=
∞
∑
m=0
cm(z;λ) · u
m
m!
.
We now prove Lemma A.1. Our proof closely follows the proof of Theorem 4 of [Yan19].
Proof of Lemma A.1. Let ∆ := ‖E[ ~Poi(~U +~λ)]−E[ ~Poi(~V +~λ)]‖TV . We have that
∆ =
1
2
· ∑
~z∈(Z≥0)D
∣∣∣∣ E
~u←~U
~Poi(~u+~λ)~z − E
~u←~V
~Poi(~u+~λ)~z
∣∣∣∣
≤ E
~z← ~Poi(~λ)
∣∣∣∣∣ E~u←~U ~Poi(~u+~λ)~z~Poi(~λ)~z − E~u←~V
~Poi(~u+~λ)~z
~Poi(~λ)~z
∣∣∣∣∣
= E
~z← ~Poi(~λ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∑~m∈(Z≥0)D
D
∏
i=1
c~mi(~zi;
~λi) · E[
~U~m]−E[~V~m]
~m!
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
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where the last equality follows from Item (2) of Proposition A.2.
Applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we get that
∆2 ≤ E
~z← ~Poi(~λ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∑~m∈(Z≥0)D
D
∏
i=1
c~mi(~zi;
~λi) · E[
~U~m]−E[~V~m]
~m!
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
= E
~z← ~Poi(~λ)
∑
~m,~m′∈(Z≥0)D
D
∏
i=1
c~mi(~zi;
~λi)c~m′i(~zi;
~λi) · E[
~U~m]−E[~V~m]
~m!
· E[
~U~m
′
]−E[~V~m′ ]
~m′!
= ∑
~m,~m′∈(Z≥0)D
E[~U~m]−E[~V~m]
~m!
· E[~U
~m′ ]−E[~V~m′ ]
~m′!
E
~z← ~Poi(~λ)
D
∏
i=1
c~mi(~zi;
~λi)c~m′i(~zi;
~λi)
= ∑
~m,~m′∈(Z≥0)D
E[~U~m]−E[~V~m]
~m!
· E[~U
~m′ ]−E[~V~m′ ]
~m′!
D
∏
i=1
E
~zi←Poi(~λi)
c~mi(~zi;
~λi)c~m′i(~zi;
~λi)
= ∑
~m∈(Z≥0)D
(
E[~U~m]−E[~V~m]
~m!
)2
·
D
∏
i=1
(~mi)!
~λ
mi
i
= ∑
~m∈(Z≥0)D
(
E[~U~m]−E[~V~m]
)2
~m! ·~λ~m ,
where the penultimate equality follows from Item (1) of Proposition A.2.
Applying Lemma A.1, the next lemma follows from a straightforward calculation.
Lemma A.3. Let U,V be two random variables supported on [0,Λ] such that E[U j] = E[V j] for all
j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L}, where L ≥ 1. For~θ,~λ ∈ (R≥0)D, let~α =
~θ2
Λ~θ +~λ
(division here is coordinate-wise, and
~θ2 denotes taking coordinate-wise square of~θ). The following holds:
‖E[ ~Poi(U~θ +~λ)]−E[ ~Poi(V~θ +~λ)]‖2TV ≤
∞
∑
z=L+1
(Λ2 · ‖~α‖1)z
z!
.
Proof. Let ∆ := ‖E[ ~Poi(U~θ +~λ)]−E[ ~Poi(V~θ +~λ)]‖TV . We also set ~U = (U −Λ)~θ,~λ′ = (Λ~θ +~λ)
and ~V = (V −Λ)~θ. Note that for every i ∈ [D], we have ~Ui ≥ (−Λ~θ)i ≥ −(Λ~θ +~λ)i = −~λ′i, and
the same holds for each ~Vi as well. Hence, we can apply Lemma A.1 to bound ∆
2 as follows:
60
∆2 = ‖E[ ~Poi(~U +~λ′)]−E[ ~Poi(~V +~λ′)]‖2TV
≤ ∑
~m∈(Z≥0)D
(
E[~U~m]−E[~V~m]
)2
~m! · (~λ′)~m
≤ ∑
~m∈(Z≥0)D
(
E[((U −Λ)~θ)~m]−E[((U −Λ)~θ)~m]
)2
~m! · (Λ~θ +~λ)~m
≤ ∑
~m∈(Z≥0)D
(
~θ~m ·E[((U −Λ))‖~m‖1 ]−~θ~m ·E[(V −Λ)|~m‖1 ]
)2
~m! · (Λ~θ +~λ)~m
≤
∞
∑
z=L+1
∑
~m∈(Z≥0)Ds.t.‖~m‖1=z
(
~θ~m · (E[(U −Λ)z]−E[(V −Λ)z])
)2
~m! · (Λ~θ +~λ)~m
≤
∞
∑
z=L+1
Λ2z ∑
~m∈(Z≥0)Ds.t.‖~m‖1=z
~θ2~m
~m! · (Λ~θ +~λ)~m ,
where the first inequality follows from Lemma A.1.
Now, recall that~α =
~θ2
Λ~θ +~λ
. We claim that
∑
~m∈(Z≥0)Ds.t.‖~m‖1=z
~α~m
~m!
=
‖~α‖z1
z!
.
To prove this equality, consider the random process of drawing z samples from [D] using
the distribution corresponding to ~α/‖~α‖1 (that is, we get i ∈ [D] with probability ~αi‖~α‖1 . It is a
well-defined distribution since~α ∈ (R≥0)D). Let ~M be the random variable corresponding to the
histogram of the z samples (that is, ~Mi denotes the number of occurrences of the element i). For
~m ∈ (Z≥0)Ds.t.‖~m‖1 = z, we have that
Pr[ ~M = ~m] =
(
~α
‖~α‖1
)~m
· z!
~m!
.
Hence, we get
∑
~m∈(Z≥0)Ds.t.‖~m‖1=z
Pr[ ~M = ~m] = 1,
and
∑
~m∈(Z≥0)Ds.t.‖~m‖1=z
~α~m
~m!
=
‖~α‖z1
z!
.
Plugging in, we obtain
∆2 ≤
∞
∑
z=L+1
Λ2z · ‖~α‖
z
1
z!
=
∞
∑
z=L+1
(Λ2 · ‖~α‖1)z
z!
.
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Applying Lemma A.3, we are now ready to prove Lemma 4.3.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. Let~α =
~θ2
Λ~θ +~λ
. We have that
‖~α‖1 = ∑
i∈[D]
~θi ·
~θi
Λ~θi +~λi
= E
i←D~θ
~θi
Λ~θi +~λi
≤ 1
2Λ2
+ Pr
i←D~θ
[Λ~θi +~λi < 2Λ
2 ·~θi] · 1
Λ
≤ 1
Λ2
.
Applying Lemma A.3, we get
E[ ~Poi(U~θ +~λ)]−E[ ~Poi(V~θ +~λ)]‖2TV ≤
∞
∑
z=L+1
1
z!
≤ 1
L!
.
B Lower Bounds on Hockey Stick Divergence
In this section, we prove Lemma 4.8 (restated below).
Lemma 4.8. (restated) There exists an absolute constant c0 such that, for every integer m ≥ 1, three reals
α, β, ε > 0 such that α > eεβ, letting ∆ = α− eεβ and supposing 4e
ε
∆
β < 1/2, it holds that
dε(Ber(α) + Bin(m, β)||Ber(β) + Bin(m, β)) ≥ ∆ · 1
2
√
2m
· exp
(
−c0 ·m · e
ε
∆
β ·
[
log(∆−1) + 1
])
.
Before proving Lemma 4.8, we need several technical lemmas. First, we show the hockey
stick divergence between Ber(α) + X and Ber(β) + X can be characterized by the hockey sticky
divergence between X + 1 and X.
Lemma B.1. Let α, β, ε > 0 be three reals such that α > eεβ, and X be a random variable over Z≥0. The
following holds:
dε(Ber(α) + X||Ber(β) + X) = (α− eεβ) · dln τ(1+ X||X),
where τ =
eε − eεβ− 1+ α
α− eεβ .
Proof. We have that
dε(Ber(α) + X||Ber(β) + X) = ∑
k∈Z≥0
[(1− α)Xk + αXk−1 − eε(1− β)Xk − eεβXk−1]+
= ∑
k∈Z≥0
[(α− εεβ) · Xk−1 − (eε − eεβ− 1+ α) · Xk]+
= (α− eεβ) · ∑
k∈Z≥0
[
Xk−1 − e
ε − eεβ− 1+ α
α− eεβ · Xk
]
+
= (α− eεβ) · dln τ(1+ X||X).
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Next, we need a lemma giving a lower bound on dε(1+ X||X) for a random variable X.
Lemma B.2. Let X be a random variable over Z≥0 and ε > 0. The following holds:
dε(1+ X||X) ≥ 1
2
· Pr
k←X
[
Xk
Xk+1
≥ 2eε
]
.
Proof. We have that
dε(1+ X||X) =
∞
∑
z=0
[Xz−1 − eεXz]+
=
∞
∑
z=0
[Xz − eεXz+1]+
≥
∞
∑
z=0
1
2
· Xz · 1[Xz ≥ 2eεXz+1]
=
1
2
Pr
k←X
[
Xk
Xk+1
≥ 2eε
]
.
Applying Lemma B.2, we obtain the following lower bound on dε(1+ Bin(n, p)||Bin(n, p)).
Lemma B.3. For n ∈ N and p ∈ (0, 0.5), ε > 0 such that 4eεp < 1/2,
dε(1+ Bin(n, p)||Bin(n, p)) ≥ 1
2
√
2n
exp(−n4eεp · log(4eε)).
Proof. We have
Bin(n, p)k
Bin(n, p)k+1
=
1− p
p
· k+ 1
n− k ≥
1− p
p
· k
n
.
By Lemma B.2,
2 · dε(1+ Bin(n, p)||Bin(n, p)) ≥ Pr
k←Bin(n,p)
[
Bin(n, p)k
Bin(n, p)k+1
≥ 2eε
]
≥ Pr
k←Bin(n,p)
[
1− p
p
· k
n
≥ 2eε
]
= Pr
[
Bin(n, p) ≥ 2eε · n · p
1− p
]
.
≥ Pr [Bin(n, p) ≥ 4eε · pn] .
Now, by anti-concentration of the binomial distribution [Rob90, Page 115], we have
Pr [Bin(n, p) ≥ 4eε · pn] ≥ 1√
2n
exp(−n · KL(4eεp||p)).
Letting λ = 4eε, we have
KL(λp||p) = λp · log λp
p
+ (1− λp) · log 1− λp
1− p ≤ λp · log
λp
p
= λp · logλ.
Putting everything together, we get
dε(1+ Bin(n, p)||Bin(n, p)) ≥ 1
2
√
2n
exp(−nλp · logλ) = 1
2
√
2n
exp(−n4eεp · log(4eε)).
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We are now ready to prove Lemma 4.8.
Proof of Lemma 4.8. Let τ =
eε − eεβ− 1+ α
α− eεβ , we have τ ≤
eε
∆
. Let N = Bin(m − 1, β). By
Lemma B.1, we have that
dε(Ber(α) + N||Ber(β) + N) ≥ ∆ · dln τ(1+ N||N).
Applying Lemma B.3 and note that 4τβ ≤ 4e
ε
∆
β < 1/2, it follows that
dln τ(1+ N||N) ≥ 1
2
√
2m
· exp(−m · 4τβ log(4τ)).
We thus have that
m · 4τβ log(4τ) ≤ O
(
m · e
ε
∆
β ·
[
log(∆−1) + 1
])
.
C Simulation of Shuffle Protocols by SQ Algorithms
In this section, we show the connection between dominated protocols and SQ algorithms, which
implies that DPkshuffle protocols can be simulated by SQ algorithms. This is analogous to the result
of Kasiviswanathan et al. [KLN+11] who proved such a connection between DPlocal protocols and
SQ algorithms. In the following, we use the notation of [KLN+11].
C.1 SQModel
We first introduce the statistical query (SQ) model. In the SQ model, algorithms access a distribu-
tion through its statistical properties instead of individual samples.
Definition C.1 (SQ Oracle). Let D be a distribution over X . An SQ oracle SQD takes as input a
function g : D → {−1, 1} and a tolerance parameter τ ∈ (0, 1); it outputs an estimate v such that:
|v− g(D)| ≤ τ.
Definition C.2 (SQ algorithm). An SQ algorithm is an algorithm that accesses the distribution D
only through the SQ oracle SQD.
C.2 Simulation of Dominated Algorithms by SQ Algorithms
We have the following simulation of dominated algorithms by SQ algorithms.
TheoremC.3. Suppose R : X →M is (ε, δ)-dominated. Then, for any distribution U and error parameter
β ≥ δ, one can take a sample from R(U) with statistical error O(β) using O(eε) queries in expectation to
SQU with tolerance τ = β/eε.
Proof. Suppose R is (ε, δ)-dominated by D. Let τ = β/eε . For every x ∈ X and z ∈ M, we use px,z
(respectively, px,E) to denote Pr[R(x) = z] (respectively, Pr[R(x) ∈ E]), and let
fz(x) =
px,z
eε · Dz and gz(x) = min(1, fz(x)).
Our algorithm is a rejection sampling procedure adapted from [KLN+11]. It works as follows:
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1. Take a sample z ← D.
2. We make a query gz to SQU with tolerance level τ, to obtain an estimate gˆz such that |gˆz −
gz(U)| ≤ τ.
3. With probability max(gˆz, 0), we output z and stop. Otherwise we go back to Step 1.
Let Tx = {z : px,z > eε · Dz}. Note that pz,Tx ≤ 2δ ≤ 2β since R is (ε, δ)-dominated by D. By
the definition of gz, it holds that gz(x) = fz(x) for every z 6∈ Tx. We will need the following claim.
Claim 1. For every x ∈ X ,
E
z←D
| fz(x)− gz(x)| ≤ 2β/eε .
Proof.
E
z←D
| fz(x)− gz(x)| ≤ ∑
z∈Tx
Dz · fz(x)
≤ ∑
z∈Tx
px,z · e−ε
≤ px,Tx/eε ≤ 2β/eε .
Now, in a single run, the above algorithm outputs z with probability in the interval
[Dz · (gz(U)− τ),Dz · (gz(U) + τ)].
Note that E
z←D
fz(U) = E
x←U ∑z
px,z
eε
= e−ε. By Claim 1, the algorithm terminates in a single run
with probability at least
E
z←D
(gz(U)− τ) ≥
(
E
z←D
fz(U)
)
− τ − 2β/eε = e−ε · (1− 3β),
and at most
E
z←D
(gz(U) + τ) ≤
(
E
z←D
fz(U)
)
+ τ + 2β/eε = e−ε · (1+ 3β).
The above implies that the algorithm makes at most O(eε) queries to SQU in expectation.
Putting everything together, our algorithm outputs zwith probability in the following interval:
Iz :=
[Dz · (gz(U)− τ) · eε
(1+ 3β)
,
Dz · (gz(U) + τ) · eε
(1− 3β)
]
.
We have that
Pr[R(U) = z] = E
x←U
px,z = fz(U) · Dz · eε.
Note that
max
v∈Iz
|v− fz(U) · Dz · eε| ≤ max
v∈Iz
|v− gz(U) · Dz · eε|+ | fz(U) · Dz · eε − gz(U) · Dz · eε| .
Moreover, we have that
max
v∈Iz
|v− gz(U) · Dz · eε| = eε ·max
{∣∣∣∣Dz · (gz(U)− τ)(1+ 3β) − gz(U) · Dz
∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣Dz · (gz(U) + τ)(1− 3β) − gz(U) · Dz
∣∣∣∣}
≤ eε · gz(U) · Dz ·O(β) + eε · Dz ·O(τ).
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The final statistical error of our sampling algorithm is therefore bounded by
∑
z∈M
max
v∈Iz
|v− fz(U) · Dz · eε| ≤ eε · ∑
z∈M
(gz(U) · Dz ·O(β) +Dz ·O(τ) + | fz(U) · Dz − gz(U) · Dz|)
≤ eε · E
z←D
[
fz(U) ·O(β) +O(τ) + | fz(U)− gz(U)|
]
(gz(U) ≤ fz(U))
≤ O(β). ( E
z←D
fz(U) = e−ε and Claim 1)
C.3 Applications
We are now ready to apply Theorem C.3 to show that protocols in the DPkshuffle model can be
simulated by SQ algorithms when the database is drawn i.i.d. from a single distribution.
Theorem C.4. Let z be a database with n entries drawn i.i.d. from a distribution U . Let P = (R, S, A) be
an (ε, o(1/n))-DPkshuffle protocol on n users. Then, there is an algorithm making O((en)
k+1 · eε) queries
in expectation to SQU with tolerance τ = Θ
(
1
(en)k+1 · eε
)
, such that its output distribution differs by at
most 0.01 in statistical distance from the output distribution of P on the dataset z.
Proof. Note that it suffices to draw n i.i.d. samples from R(U). By Lemma 1.8, we now that R
is (ε + k(1 + ln n), o(1/n))-dominated. Let γ = eε+k(1+ln n) = eε · (en)k. By Theorem C.3, using
O(γ) queries in expectation to SQU with tolerance τ = Θ(1/γn), we can sample from R(U) with
statistical error 1/100n. Taking n such samples completes the proof.
We remark that [BFJ+94] proved that if an SQ algorithm solves ParityLearning with probability
at least 0.99, T queries and tolerance 1/T, then T = Ω(2D/3) (recall that D is the dimension of
the hidden vector in ParityLearning). Combing the foregoing lower bound with Theorem C.4, it
translates to an Ω(2D/3(k+1)) lower bound on the sample complexity of (O(1), o(1/n))-DPkshuffle
protocols solving ParityLearning, which is slightly weaker than our Theorem 1.10.
D Upper Bounds for Selection in DPkshuffle
In this section, we give a proof sketch for the DPkshuffle protocol for Selection with sample complex-
ity O˜(D/
√
k).
TheoremD.1. For any k ≤ D, ε = O(1) and δ = 1/ poly(n), there is an (ε, δ)-DPkshuffle protocol solving
Selection with probability at least 0.99 and n = O˜(D/
√
k).
Proof Sketch. Let ε = O(1) and δ = 1/ poly(n) be the privacy parameters. We also let ε0 =
Θ(ε/
√
k), δ0 = 1/ poly(n) and n = Θ˜(D/
√
k) to be specified later.
We can assume that k = (log n)ω(1), as otherwise the protocol simply follows from the O˜(D)
sample upper bound by an (ε, δ)-DP1shuffle protocol [GGK
+19].
Let m = k/ log2 n, and N = nm/D. Note that by our choice of k and D, N = (log n)ω(1).
Now for each i ∈ [D], our protocol maintains an (ε0, δ0)-DP subprotocol aiming at estimat-
ing the fraction of users whose input x satisfies xi = 1. These subprotocols assume they will
receive between 0.99N and 1.01N inputs. By [GMPV20, BBGN20], there is such a protocol which
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achieves errorO(ε−10 log n)with probability at least 1− 1/n2 and usingO
(
log(1/δ)
logN
)
≤ O(log n)
messages.
In our protocol, each user selects k/ log2 n coordinates from [D] uniformly at random, and
participates in the corresponding subprotocols. Finally, the analyzer aggregates the outputs of all
subprotocols and outputs the coordinate with the highest estimate.
Note that by a union bound a Chernoff bound, it follows that with probability at least 1 −
n−ω(1), the number of users of every subprotocol falls in the range [0.99N, 1.01N], and their mean
is 0.01-close to the true mean of i-th coordinates of all users.
Setting ε0 = Θ(ε/
√
k) and δ0 = 1/ poly(n) appropriately, the protocol is (ε, δ)-DP by the
advanced composition theorem of DP [DRV10]. Moreover, with probability at least 1− 1/n, all
subprotocols obtain estimates with errorO(ε−10 log n).
Setting n so that ε−10 log n = o (N), our protocol solves Selection with probability at least 0.99.
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